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INTERSTATE GROUNDWATER LAW IN THE SNAKE VALLEY:
EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT AND A NEW MODEL FOR
TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFER MANAGEMENT
Noah D. Hall & Benjamin L. Cavataro*
Abstract
As demand for freshwater increases and surface water supplies
diminish, states increasingly tap groundwater to meet their water needs.
Like rivers and lakes, groundwater aquifers cross state lines and create
legal challenges for allocation and management. For over a century, the
Supreme Court has applied its equitable-apportionment doctrine to
allocate shared surface water supplies among states. The Court has not
yet been faced with an equitable-apportionment action for groundwater,
but several disputes are emerging around the country that may soon
command the Court's attention.
This Article examines how the equitable apportionment doctrine can
be applied to an interstate groundwater dispute, using the Snake Valley
Aquifer shared by Nevada and Utah as a case study. Equitable
apportionment is a viable doctrine for resolving interstate groundwater
disputes, but it is not ideal. Instead, interstate compacts provide a
constitutional mechanism for cooperation by which states may protect
and utilize a shared natural resource. There are over twenty interstate
compacts currently in effect, covering major interstate waters such as the
Colorado River and the Great Lakes. Some of these compacts address
connected groundwater, but none to date are focused on sustainable
aquifer management. Recently, Nevada and Utah have developed a
proposed agreement to manage the Snake Valley Aquifer. While the
proposed agreement was rejected for political reasons, and the Snake
Valley Aquifer dispute itself seems headed for litigation, the agreement
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provides a modelfor sustainable and cooperative transboundary aquifer
management.
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INTRODUCTION
As demand for freshwater in the United States increases, surface water
supplies from rivers and lakes are becoming stressed and overallocated.' Demand
for surface water already exceeds available supply from the Colorado River, the
key source of water for many western states.2 Climate change is expected to
exacerbate this situation. As surface waters become unavailable for use, states are
increasingly tapping groundwater supplies to meet their water demands.
Groundwater withdrawals have more than doubled in the last sixty years,
increasing from 34 billion gallons per day in 1950 to nearly 80 billion gallons per
day in 2005.4 Groundwater withdrawals now account for almost one-fifth of
freshwater use in the United States.
Groundwater use is ordinarily a state-law matter.6 But with more utilization of
groundwater, interstate conflicts and disputes over the use of transboundary
groundwater resources are emerging around the country, even outside the arid
West.7 This Article focuses on a recent dispute in the Snake Valley, which
straddles the Nevada-Utah border in the Great Basin Desert, one of the driest areas
in the country.
See generally Robert H. Abrams & Noah D. Hall, Framing Water Policy in a
Carbon Affected and Carbon Constrained Environment, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 3 (2010)
(addressing the immense stress on surface water supplies caused by massive changes
affecting water supply and demand).
2 See Noah D. Hall, Interstate Water Compacts and Climate Change Adaptation, 5
ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 237, 284-86 (2010).
3 See id.; Abrams & Hall, supra note 1; Noah D. Hall et al., Climate Change and
Freshwater Resources, 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 30 (2008).
4 JOAN F. KENNY ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN
THE UNITED STATES IN 2005, at 43 tbl.14 (2009), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/134
4/pdf/c1344.pdf.
' Id. (noting that approximately 350 billion gallons of freshwater were withdrawn
each day in 2005, of which 79.6 billion gallons were groundwater).
6 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, How FEDERAL POLICIES AFFECT THE ALLOCATION OF
WATER 4 (2006) ("For interstate groundwater, the laws of each state govern access to and
use of an aquifer's resources withdrawn in its jurisdiction . . . even for the largest aquifer
crossing state boundaries-the High Plains aquifer, which extends over 174,000 square
miles and involves eight states . . . ."); Dean Baxtresser, Note, Antiques Roadshow: The
Common Law and the Coming Age of Groundwater Marketing, 108 MICH. L. REv. 773,
788 n.69 (2010) ("As a whole, federal law rarely interferes with groundwater allocation at
the state level . . ).
7 See A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 10:24 (2012)
("Interstate groundwater conflicts are becoming more common."); Amy Hardberger,
Comment, What Lies Beneath: Determining the Necessity of International Groundwater
Policy Along the United States-Mexico Border and a Roadmap to an Agreement, 35 TEX.
TECH L. REv. 1211, 1225 (2004) ("Until recently, almost all interstate water cases involved
surface water.").
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In 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was faced with an
interstate groundwater dispute between Tennessee and Mississippi. 8 It is only a
matter of time before one of these disputes reaches the Supreme Court of the
United States, pursuant to the Court's original jurisdiction to resolve disputes
between states.9 The dispute between Nevada and Utah over the Snake Valley
Aquifer-which will likely end up before the Court-presents an important case
study on the emerging law of interstate groundwater, perhaps foreshadowing how
future interstate groundwater conflicts will be handled.
Part I of this Article details the geography, science, and politics of the Snake
Valley Aquifer. Las Vegas's growth and limited water supplies have sent the city
searching for water, proposing a pipeline to pump Snake Valley Aquifer three
hundred miles south. At first, the concerns were addressed through a federal water
resource study and the development of a cooperative agreement between the two
states, carefully negotiated over a period of years. But cooperation has given way
to politics, and the dispute now seems headed for litigation.
Part II of this Article discusses how, aided by a comprehensive federal study
of the relevant water resources, Nevada and Utah developed a proposed interstate
agreement to govern the use and management of the Snake Valley Aquifer: the
Agreement for Management of the Snake Valley Groundwater System (Snake
Valley Agreement).' 0 We compare the Agreement to other federally approved
interstate agreements-compacts'"-which have been the preferred tool for
cooperative interstate surface water management for nearly a century.' 2 We review
the Agreement's provisions in detail, including its extensive monitoring and
environmental provisions, the careful balance between public supply and private
rights that it strikes, and how the Agreement's drafters envisioned its practical
operation. We discuss how the intense (and in our view, misguided) opposition in
Utah, marked by misleading rhetoric and unsupported fears, led to the decision by
the State of Utah to not sign the Agreement. Finally, we suggest that while the
Snake Valley Agreement died a political death, the Agreement's provisions
relating to groundwater allocation and environmental monitoring and protection
can serve as a model for future interstate groundwater agreements, worthy of
consideration by policymakers, scholars, practitioners, and water managers in
future transboundary aquifer disputes.
8 See Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 632 (5th Cir. 2009),
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1319 (2010).
9 See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2.
10 Agreement for Management of the Snake Valley Groundwater System, Utah-Nev.,
opened for comments Aug. 13, 2009 [hereinafter Final Proposed Agreement], available at
http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/nv/groundwaterdevelopment/water rights. P
ar. 14440.File.dat/Final%20NV-UT%20Snake%2OValley%20Agreement.pdf.
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
12 See Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water
Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 405, 409-13 (2006).
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Part III of this Article explores the novel legal challenges of adjudicating an
interstate groundwater dispute in the Supreme Court, which has original
jurisdiction to hear disputes between states" and has developed the doctrine of
equitable apportionment to resolve interstate disputes over shared surface waters.14
While the Supreme Court has never applied its equitable apportionment doctrine to
groundwater, the Court has applied the doctrine to other shared interstate natural
resources.' 5 Further, the Fifth Circuit recently held that equitable apportionment of
groundwater was appropriate in the interstate dispute between Tennessee and
Mississippi.16 Applying the facts of the Snake Valley case to the precedents the
Court developed, we then carry out an analysis of the key arguments and likely
outcomes of a potential equitable apportionment action brought by Nevada against
Utah over the Snake Valley Aquifer.
I. CONFLICT IN THE SNAKE VALLEY
The Snake Valley Aquifer dispute provides an ideal case study to explore
interstate groundwater law. In many ways, the dispute is a microcosm of water
conflict in the United States in the twenty-first century. Water in this dry region
has historically been used for local agriculture, with the Snake Valley Aquifer
supporting a small community of residents and farmers on both sides of the
Nevada-Utah border. While local water use for domestic supply and agriculture
has remained fairly constant, climate change has led to a loss of winter snowpack,
which feeds the aquifer. This will diminish water supplies in the future. '7 New
water demands for the urban population in Las Vegas (three hundred miles away)
now threatens the current local balance between supply and demand. Further,
many stakeholders want to limit total water withdrawals to protect groundwater-
" U.S. CONsT. art. III, §§ 1, 2.
14 See Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984) (Colorado II) (defining the
doctrine of equitable apportionment); Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982)
(Colorado 1) (same); see also infra Part III (discussing equitable apportionment).
15 See, e.g., Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1024 (1983) ("Although
that doctrine has its roots in water rights litigation, the natural resource of anadromous fish
is sufficiently similar to make equitable apportionment an appropriate mechanism for
resolving allocative disputes."). The Fifth Circuit noted this in reasoning that equitable
apportionment applies to groundwater. Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 570
F.3d 625, 630 n.6 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 1319 (2010).
16 See Hood, 570 F.3d at 632.
17 Gregory T. Pederson et al., The Unusual Nature of Recent Snowpack Declines in
the North American Cordillera, 333 SCIENCE 332, 332-35 (2011) (finding that runoff from
winter snowpack accounts for 60% to 80% of water supply of the Colorado, Columbia, and
Missouri river drainages, which support more than 70 million people living in the West and
projecting that as warming-induced snowpack continues through the twenty-first century,
the result will be a "substantial strain" on water infrastructure that will "threaten many
current water storage and allocation strategies").
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dependent ecosystem functions and environmental services, most notably
vegetation that prevents erosion and dust storms.
In short, the Snake Valley Aquifer dispute is not simply between two states,
but also between growing cities and traditional farming and between consumptive
water use and environmental protection. It provides an ideal setting to consider the
viability of existing legal doctrines and regimes to address the emerging problems
of interstate groundwater.
A. Geography and Natural History of the Snake Valley
The Snake Valley straddles the border between Utah and Nevada in the Great
Basin Desert. Located roughly three hundred miles north of Las Vegas, it is
bounded on the west by the Snake Range (extending from south of the Kern
Mountains to the southernmost part of White Pine County) and on the east by the
Conger and Confusion ranges." According to one reckoning, the south end of the
valley lies some ten miles north of Modena, Utah, and the north end lies in the
Great Salt Lake Desert, some sixty miles south-southwest of Wendover, Utah.19
The Snake Valley is a narrow, north-trending, continuous depression that is
forty-three miles wide at its maximum extent. 2 0 Depending on how the area in
defined, the Snake Valley itself may be said to be between five hundred and 3,480
square miles in area21 and anywhere from ninety-five to 135 miles long from north
to south.22 But the Snake Valley is hydrologically connected to a much larger area.
The U.S. Geological Survey's Utah-Nevada Basin and Range Carbonate-Rock
18 HELEN S. CARLSON, NEVADA PLACE NAMES: A GEOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 219
(1974); JOHN W. VAN COTT, UTAH PLACE NAMES 345 (1990).
9 JAMES W. HOOD & F. EUGENE RUSH, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, WATER-
RESOURCES APPRAISAL OF THE SNAKE VALLEY AREA, UTAH AND NEVADA 4 (1965),
available at http://images.water.nv.gov/images/publications/recon%20reports/rpt34-snake_
valley.pdf.
20 Id. at 4 (stating that the Snake Valley is nearly forty-three miles in width and
bounded "by latitudes 37055' and 40oN. and longitudes 113o20' and 1140 15'W").
21 Compare id. (stating that the Snake Valley is 3,480 square miles in area), with
Mitch Longson, The Snake Valley Water Dispute: Forecast for Crisis or Catalyst for
Change in America's Southwest?, 12 HINCKLEY J. OF POL. 47, 49 (2011), available at
http://epubs.utah.edu/index.php/HJP/article/viewFile/506/372 (reporting that the Snake
Valley is five hundred square miles in area).
22 Compare HOOD & RUSH, supra note 19, at 4 (stating that the Snake Valley is 135
miles in length), with Longson, supra note 21, at 49 (stating the Snake Valley is about one
hundred miles in length), and Peter D. Rowley et al., Geology and Hydrogeology of the
Snake Valley Area, Western Utah and Eastern Nevada, in GEOLOGY & GEOLOGIC
RESOURCES & ISSUES OF W. UTAH 251, 251 (Bryce Tripp et al. eds., 2009), available at
http://techplace.datapages.com/data/uga/data/081/081001/251_ugs810251.htm (stating the
Snake Valley is ninety-five miles in length).
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Aquifer System Study (BARCASS), 23 carried out in accordance with a mandate
from the federal Lincoln County Conservation, Recreation, and Development Act
24
of 2004, examined a "study area" of 13,500 square miles, encompassing not only
the Snake Valley, but also twelve other hydrographic areas. 2 5 Except for the Snake
Valley, all of these hydrographic areas are located entirely in Nevada.2 6 The Snake
Valley includes the western parts of Iron, Millard, Juab, Beaver, and Toole
counties in Utah and northeastern Lincoln and eastern White Pine counties in
Nevada.27
The Snake Valley area was originally settled by Native Americans.28
Archeological evidence suggests that the valley was first occupied between 10,000
to 12,000 years ago. 29 The valley's first nonnative permanent settler arrived in
1861.30 The Snake Valley remains sparsely populated today; it has some 1,000
23 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATIONS RPT. 2007-5261, WATER
RESOURCES OF THE BASIN AND RANGE CARBONATE-ROCK AQUIFER SYSTEM, WHITE PINE
COUNTY, NEVADA, AND ADJACENT AREAS IN NEVADA AND UTAH (Alan H. Welch et al.
eds., 2007), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2007/5261/pdf/sir20075261.pdf [herein-
after BARCASS].
24 Pub. L. No. 108-424 § 301 (e)(1) (2004) (discussed infra Part I.C).
25 BARCASS, supra note 23, at 7, 9-10. "Hydrographic areas [HAs] in Nevada were
delineated systematically by the U.S. Geological Survey and Nevada Division of Water
Resources in the late 1960s" and continue to be used in scientific studies and reports, as
well as for administration. Id. at 9 n. 1. In Nevada, there are a total of 256 hydrographic
areas and subareas located within fourteen major hydrographic regions or basins. Water
Words Dictionary, NEV. DIV. OF WATER RESOURCES, http://water.nv.gov/programs/plannin
g/dictionary/ (follow "Appendix A-I" hyperlink).
Each HA is designated by a name and a number. In addition to the Snake Valley
(254), the other HAs that were part of the USGS Report to Congress study area were
Newark Valley (154), Little Smoky Valley (Northern and Central part) (155A and 155B);
Jakes Valley (174), Long Valley (175), Butte Valley (Southern Part) (178B), Steptoe
Valley (179), Cave Valley (180), Lake Valley (183), Spring Valley (184), Tippett Valley
(185), White River Valley (207). See BARCASS, supra note 23, at 10 (map and legend of
study area).
26 BARCASS, supra note 23, at 10.
27 HOOD & RUSH, supra note 19, at 4.
28 See David B. Madsen, Prehistoric Ceramics, in II HANDBOOK OF NORTH
AMERICAN INDIANS: GREAT BASIN 211-12 (William C. Sturtevant ed., 1978).
29 THE DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., SOUTHWEST INTERTIE
PROJECT: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT AND PROPOSED PLAN AMENDMENT
3-4 (1993), http://www.wapa.gov/dsw/environment/SWIP.htm (linking to the Final
Environmental ImpactStatement and Proposed Plan Amendment, ch. 3, pt. 2) (stating that
before nonnative settlement, the Snake Valley was successively occupied by Paleo-Indians,
then Archaic cultures, then the agrarian Fremont culture, and finally by nomadic Numic-
speaking peoples).
30 Garrison, Utah, GREAT BASIN NAT'L HERITAGE AREA, http://www.greatbasin
heritage.org/great-basin-heritage-Garrison-Utah.html (last visited Aug. 2012) ("Daniel A.
Gonder, the first permanent settler in Snake Valley, was only nineteen when he arrived in
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people and a number of tiny unincorporated communities: Callao, Trout Creek,
Partoun, EskDale, Garrison, and Gandy in Utah, and Baker in Nevada.3 1
Underneath the Snake Valley, the aquifer divided by the Utah-Nevada border
has around 132,000 acre-feet of water.32 No state has more federally managed land
than Nevada, and like much of the rest of Nevada and Utah, the vast majority of
the Snake Valley is federally managed land.34 While historically Nevada's state
government has only laid claim to lands near a water source,35 since 1997 the state
and Southern Nevada Water Authority (SNWA) have sought to release federally
managed lands in Nevada in order to allow development, primarily around Las
Vegas; the state wishes to pump water from the aquifer and pipe it to Las Vegas.
B. The Rise ofLas Vegas and the City's Search for Water
The Snake Valley dispute is not really between the residents of Nevada and
Utah that inhabit the border region. Rather, the dispute is between Las Vegas and
the Snake Valley's residents on both sides of the border (but especially Utah). The
growth of Las Vegas as a desert city and the city's ongoing efforts to reduce its
water use are thus at the center of the Snake Valley Aquifer dispute. For water
1861 and decided to settle on Snake Creek.") (citing BOYD E. QUATE, PIONEERS OF SNAKE
VALLEY 1865-1935 AS REMEMBERED BY THEIR DESCENDANTS (1993)).
31 See Longson, supra note 21, at 48 (the Snake Valley has around one thousand
inhabitants); LEWIS YOUNG ROBERTSON & BUININGHAM, INC., Socio-ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS, SNAKE VALLEY WATER-JUAB AND MILLER COUNTIES, UTAH 3 (2010)
[hereinafter Socio-EcoNoMic ANALYSIS], available at http://greatbasinwater.net/pubs/Sna
ke%20Valley%20 Economic% 20Study%202010.pdf; see also Henry Brean, Utah Rejects
Water Deal With Nevada, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Apr. 3, 2013, http://www.reviewjournal
.com/news/wate r-environment/utah-rejects-water-deal-nevada ("Snake Valley covers an
area roughly the size of Delaware but is home to just a few scattered towns and farms.").
32 Socio-EcoNOMic ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 3.
3 As of 2004, Nevada was by far the state with the greatest percentage of federally
owned land, with 84.5% of the state owned by the federal government, compared with
69.1% in Alaska. The Open West, Owned by the Federal Government, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/03/23/us/westem-land-owned-by-the-
federal-government.html?_r-0.
34 Rowley et al., supra note 22; accord Longson, supra note 21, at 49.
35 Emily Green, Quenching Las Vegas' Thirst: Part 3, The Equation: No Water, No
Growth, LAS VEGAS SUN, June 15, 2008, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2008/jun/15/
equation-no-water-no-growth ("[I]n 1880, fledgling Nevada persuaded Washington to
downsize state-held land from 3.9 million acres to its choice of 2 million so it could
concentrate development around existing settlements and lakes, rivers and springs. As far
as Nevada was concerned, the federal government could control the other roughly 68
million acres.").
36 Id. The Snake Valley project is part of the broader Groundwater Development
Project of the Southern Nevada Water Authority. See Groundwater Development Project,
S. NEv. WATER AUTH., http://www.snwa.com/ws/fiture gdp.html (last visited Jan. 8,
2014).
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wonks, Las Vegas presents a tale of two cities. With its rapid population growth
and iconic images of luxurious water fountains surrounded by arid desert, Las
Vegas can be portrayed as the poster child of unsustainable water use in America.
However, Las Vegas has also implemented some of the nation's most progressive
and effective water conservation policies, building a record of responsible water
use that contradicts the negative images. Whether Las Vegas needs water because
of, or in spite of, its water-use practices will be a central question before the
Supreme Court in a potential equitable apportionment dispute (discussed in Part
III, infra). But the reality is that Las Vegas needs more water for its population
than can be met with local supplies, thus the city's search for water that eventually
ended in the Snake Valley.
Las Vegas was first permanently settled by nonnatives in 1855.37 Over the
next 150 years, the Las Vegas area experienced explosive growth. Clark County,
dominated by Las Vegas and its suburbs, grew almost exponentially in population,
with double- and triple-digit percentage increases in population at every Census
since 1920.38 In 2012 Clark County's population was estimated to be just over 2
million, more than quadruple its 1970 population.39 Its residents make up 72.5% of
the state's' population,40 giving the area outsized political influence in this swing
state. 4 ' The rapid expansion of the Las Vegas metropolitan area can be seen in
NASA satellite imagery.42 Until recently, Las Vegas was the national leader in an
unprecedented quarter-century of growth not only in population, but also in
economic activity; the state had the nation's fastest rate of economic growth and
job creation.4 3 While the Great Recession has abated growth somewhat,4
37 EUGENE P. MOEHRING & MICHAEL S. GREEN, LAS VEGAS: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY
1-4 (2005).
3 Richard L. Forstall, Nevada Population of Counties by Decennial Census: 1900 to
1990, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS (Mar. 27, 1995), http://www.census.gov/population/ce
ncounts/nvl90090.txt; State & County QuickFacts: Clark County, Nevada, U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfdi/states/32/32003.html [hereinafter Quick
Facts] (last visited Jan., 8, 2014). See also Debra L. Hughson, Human Population in the
Mojave Desert: Resources and Sustainability, in THE MOJAVE DESERT: ECOSYSTEM
PROCESSES AND SUSTAINABILITY 57, 66 (Robert H. Webb et al. eds., 2009) ("During the
twentieth century, growth in Clark Country was nearly exponential, doubling about every
9.8 years . . . .").
3 QuickFacts, supra note 38.
40 id.
41 See Micah Cohen, In Nevada, Obama, Ryan and Signs of a New (Democratic-
Leaning) Normal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2012, http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012
/11/01 /in-nevada-obama-ryan-and-signs-of-a-new-democratic-leaning-normal.
4 2 Image of the Day: 25 Years of Growth in Las Vegas, NASA EARTH OBSERVATORY,
(Mar. 1, 2009), http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=37228 (including satellite
imagery from the Landsat 5 satellite, taken from 1984 to 2009).
. 43 Ron Sylvester, Economists: Las Vegas Poised for Steady, Sustainable Growth, LAS
VEGAS SUN, Dec. 10, 2012, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2012/dec/10/economists-las
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demographers and economists continue to predict that Las Vegas will experience
steady, continuous growth through 2050.45
As Las Vegas continued to grow, it experienced the strain of providing water
to a burgeoning metropolitan area in the desert. On the cusp of major postwar
growth, the Nevada Legislature and voters created the area's first public water
authority, the Las Vegas Valley Water District, in 1948.46 In the summer of 1954,
the new district formally assumed control of the Las Vegas Land and Water
Company, which had previously provided the area's water, after negotiating a
purchase funded by a bond issue.47 This purchase heralded a new era in which Las
Vegas area water officials began to systemically plan to acquire and manage water
resources for the ever-growing city. 4 8
In October 1960, federal, state, and local leaders held a conference, attended
by Nevada Senators Alan Bible and Howard Cannon, as well as Representative
Walter Baring, on strategies to bring Colorado River water via Lake Mead to Las
Vegas. Under the powerful influence of Senator Bible, the Bureau of Reclamation
moved to study Las Vegas's needs and the Lake Mead proposal. 4 9 Due in large
part to the personal friendships between Senator Bible and Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson, Nevada was able to secure money for its Southern Nevada Water Project
in October 1965.50
Funded by state bonds as well as federal loans, the Southern Nevada Water
Project was a creature of the Great Society era; it involved a sprawling water
infrastructure, including pipelines, mountain tunnels, pumping stations, and a
-vegas-poised-steady-sustainable-gro/ (citing statement of Stephen Brown, Director, Center
for Business and Economic Research, University of Nevada, Las Vegas).
44 Las Vegas was hit extremely hard in the Recession. See Adam Nagoumey, Las
Vegas Faces Its Deepest Slide Since the 1940s, N.Y. TIMES Oct. 2, 2010), http://www.ny
times.com/2010/10/03/us/03vegas.html (describing Las Vegas's economic travails); Stacy
J. Willis, When the Earth Was Scorched: An Oral History ofDevelopment, Destruction and
the Great Recession in Las Vegas, VEGAS SEVEN (Aug. 16, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://vegas
seven.com/feature/2012/08/16/when-earth-was-scorched (giving an oral history and
timeline of the Great Recession's effect on Las Vegas).
45 Ron Sylvester, Economists: Las Vegas Poised for Steady, Sustainable Growth, LAS
VEGAS SUN, Dec. 10, 2012, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2012/dec/10/economists-las
-vegas-poised-steady-sustainable-gro/ (quoting Stephen Brown, Director, Center for
Business and Economic Research, University of Nevada, Las Vegas).
46 JAMES W. HULSE, NEVADA'S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY: PROGRESS OR PLUNDER
58 (2009) (noting that the LVVWD's creation allowed the city "to wean itself from its
dependency on the private company established by Senator Clark four decades earlier");
MOEHRING & GREEN, supra note 37, at 161-62.
47 HULSE, supra note 46, at 58; MOEHRING & GREEN, supra note 37, at 161-62.
48 HULSE, supra note 46, at 58; MOEHRING & GREEN, supra note 37, at 162.
49 GARY ELLIOTT, SENATOR ALAN BIBLE AND THE POLITICS OF THE NEW WEST 151
(1994).
5o HULSE, supra note 46, at 59.
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distribution complex." Commenced in 1966, the first stage was completed in 1971
with the first large-diameter water line providing 130,000 acre-feet per year to Las
Vegas; the second and third stages, completed in April 1982, provided almost all
of the rest of the water to which Nevada was entitled under the 1922 Colorado
River Compact to the Las Vegas Valley-enough for almost one million people. 52
The population of the Las Vegas area now exceeds two million.
By the late 1980s it became clear that Las Vegas's steep rate of growth,
combined with its finite water resources, would lead to a critical water crisis by the
turn of the twenty-first century.54 Emerging onto the scene at this time was the
dominant figure in Las Vegas water management: Patricia Mulroy, the general
manager of the Las Vegas Valley Water District. A "practical visionary for the
post-reclamation era," Mulroy has been described as a hard-driving, savvy, and
creative administrator determined to secure more water for Las Vegas.ss
Considered a genius by some and reviled by others, by the 1980s Mulroy saw the
central front of water management in the West moving away from the colossal
federal water infrastructure of the past and toward political and financial
negotiations to allocate existing water more efficiently within existing
* 56infrastructure.
Notwithstanding a raft of water conservation measures, a decline in per
capita usage because of urbanization,58 and the water banking deals negotiated
51 See id.; MOEHRING & GREEN, supra note 37, at 193-94.
52 HULSE, supra note 46, at 59; MOEHRING & GREEN, supra note 37, at 194. For a
detailed history of the Southern Nevada Water Project, later renamed the Robert B. Griffith
Water Project, see generally JEDEDIAH ROGERS, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ROBERT
B. GRIFFITH WATER PROJECT (FORMERLY SOUTHERN NEVADA WATER PROJECT) (2006),
available at http://www.usbr.gov/projects//ImageServer?imgName=Doc_1305577385454
.pdf.
5 See QuickFacts, supra note 38.
54 Jon Christensen, Build It and the Water Will Come, in THE GRIT BENEATH THE
GLITTER: TALES FROM THE REAL LAS VEGAS 115, 115 (Hal K. Rothman & Mike Davis
eds., 2002).
5 Christensen, supra note 54, at 115-17.
5Id. at 115-16.
5 See infra notes 424-439 and accompanying text.
58 Hughson, supra note 38, at 66 ("Per capita water consumption has declined from
7400 m3 y-'p' in 1910 to less than 400 m3y'p-' 1I today, in response to the transition from a
sparsely populated agricultural economy to a densely populated urban/tourist economy.").
Las Vegas's population increases almost entirely cancel out the decline in per capita water
consumption. See also UNIV. OF MD., CTR. FOR INTEGRATIVE ENVTL. RESEARCH,
ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON NEVADA 10 (2008), http://www.cier.umd
.edu/climateadaptation/Nevada%20Economic%20Impacts%20ofo2OClimate%2OChange.p
df ("It is imperative to note that increasing demand for water due to population growth is
not the primary cause for diminished water levels in the State of Nevada. Nevada has
implemented very successful water conservation strategies that have allowed the state to
reduce its water consumption by about 18 billion gallons from 2002 to 2006. This is
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with other states, the growing demand from the population increases in Las Vegas
began "pushing the limit of Nevada's share of Colorado River water."59 Indeed,
Nevada has squeezed every drop of water from its Colorado River allotment and
more: because the apportionment of Colorado River water is based on net
allocation (consumptive use), Nevada is able to use return-flow credits (used water
recycling) and groundwater banking to withdraw from Lake Mead five-thirds
(166%) of its apportionment since Nevada then returns a portion of its water back
to the river.60
Exaceibating the water crisis was a new climate challenge: a series of
droughts. The water level of Lake Mead dropped almost every year between 1985
and 1993, and while water levels rose between 1993 and 1998, even reaching a
near-high point in 1998, drought conditions soon returned, and by 2006 Lake
Mead's water level was at its lowest level since 1968.61
As the supply of the Colorado River was running perilously close to
insufficient, Las Vegas looked to the groundwater of the north in the sparsely
populated Lincoln, Nye, and White Pine counties. 62 In 1989 the Las Vegas Valley
Water District proposed a $1.5 billion aquifer project, proposing the drilling of 140
wells to extract water, the construction of many new reservoirs to store it, and the
laying of some one thousand miles of pipeline to connect it to Las Vegas, with the
aim of diverting around 200,000 acre-feet of water to Las Vegas annually. 63 To do
this, the Las Vegas Valley Water District filed 146 applications with the Nevada
State Engineer in October 1989 to claim unappropriated groundwater in twenty-six
valleys covering thirty different basins in four Nevada counties: "every drop" of
available groundwater in a 20,000-square-mile area extending up to 250 miles
north of Las Vegas. 64 These applications laid claim to 805,000 acre-feet of
significant because during this time period the population of southern Nevada grew by
330,000 and the region sustained about 40 million visitors.").
59 Hughson, supra note 38, at 65.
60 Id. at 65-66; Return Flow Credits, S. NEV. WATER AuTH., http://www.snwa.com/
ws/reclaimedreturnflow.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2014).
61 HULSE, supra note 46, at 60.62 d
63 Id.
6 Id.; see also CHARLES FISHMAN, THE BIG THIRST: THE SECRET LIFE AND
TURBULENT FUTURE OF WATER 61 (2011); Christensen, supra note 54, at 117; Hughson,
supra note 38, at 65. The LVVWD also concurrently filed one application for surface water
rights, to the Virgin River, a tributary of the Colorado River that starts near Zion National
Park and flows through Nevada to Lake Mead. The Virgin River is a low-lying seasonal
river that was not included in the Colorado River Compact because it was considered
nonnavigable at the time. See HAL ROTHMAN, NEON METROPOLIS: How LAS VEGAS
STARTED THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 214 (2002) [hereinafter ROTHMAN, NEON
METROPOLIS]; HAL K. ROTHMAN, PLAYING THE ODDS: LAS VEGAS AND THE MODERN
WEST 157 (Lincoln Bramwell ed., 2007) [hereinafter ROTHMAN, PLAYING THE ODDS];
Christensen, supra note 54, at 117; Hughson, supra, at 38.
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groundwater.65 Nine of these applications were for Snake Valley groundwater with
points of diversion within the State of Nevada.66
Although a number of the 1989 applications were subsequently withdrawn, 6 7
the applications still pending remain extraordinarily contentious and very much
part of the present Snake Valley Aquifer dispute. Many protests were filed
challenging the applications. 6 8 Foreshadowing the present resistance to the Snake
Valley Agreement, ranchers in Nevada expressed outrage. 69 Opponents used as a
"battle cry" the memory of the Owens Valley, which dried up after the
construction of the Los Angeles Aqueduct and was a central part in the California
water wars.7 0 Twenty years on, a stalemate, and a rancorous raft of litigation,
65 See ROTHMAN, NEON METROPOLIS, supra note 64, at 214; ROTHMAN, PLAYING THE
ODDS, supra note 64, at 157; WATER IN THE WEST: A HIGH COUNTRY NEWS READER 233
(Char Miller ed., 2000) (all stating that applications totaled 805,000 acre-feet); Christensen,
supra note 54, at 117. But see FISHMAN, supra note 64, at 61 (claiming applications totaled
865,000 acre-feet).
66 For exact points of diversion, see the Applications for Permit to Appropriate the
Public Waters of the State of Nevada Nos. 54022-30, available at
http://images.water.nv.gov/images/book records/54000/54022.pdf;
http://images.water.nv.gov/images/book records/54000/54023.pdf;
http://images.water.nv.gov/images/book records/54000/54024.pdf;
http://images.water.nv.gov/images/book records/54000/54025.pdf;
http://images.water.nv.gov/images/book records/54000/54026.pdf;
http://images.water.nv.gov/images/book records/54000/54027.pdf;
http://images.water.nv.gov/images/book records/54000/54028.pdf;
http://images.water.nv.gov/images/book records/54000/54029.pdf;
http://images.water.nv.gov/images/book records/54000/54030.pdf.
67 Hughson, supra note 38, at 65.
68 There are voluminous administrative and technical records on the October 17,
1989, applications. See, e.g., In re Applications 53987 through 53992, Ruling No. 5875
(Office of the Nev. State Eng'r, July 8, 2008), available at http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/
medialib/blm/nv/groundwater development/water rights.Par.41567.File.dat/SNWA%20rul
ing%205875%20DDC.pdf; STANKA CONSULTING, LTD, COMMITTED GROUNDWATER
RESOURCES IN FOUR NEVADA HYDROGRAPHIC AREAS: CAVE, DRY LAKE, DELAMAR, AND
SPRING VALLEYS (2011), available at http://water.nv.gov/hearings/past/springetal/browse
abledocs/Exhibits%5CSNWA%20Exhibits/SNWAExh_097_Stanka%20Report.pdf.
69 See, e.g., ROTHMAN, PLAYING THE ODDS, supra note 64, at 157 ("Despite Mulroy's
promise that she didn't want to 'wipe out' rural Nevada, the cow counties saw the water
grab as social genocide.").
70 Christensen, supra note 54, at 117. The history of the Los Angeles Aqueduct
project and the Owens Valley is treated in Gary D. Libecap, Chinatown: Owens Valley and
Western Water Reallocation-Getting the Record Straight and What It Means for Water
Markets, 83 TEX. L. REv. 2055 (2005); William L. Kahrl, Part II: The Politics of
Cahfornia Water: Owens Valley and the Los Angeles Aqueduct, 1900-1927, CAL. HIST. Q.,
Summer 1976, at 98, reprinted in 6 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 255 (2000).
The Los Angeles/Owens Valley water war was famously dramatized in the 1974 film
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wears on. The State Engineer has granted the SNWA (the successor to the Las
Vegas Valley Water District, as discussed below) groundwater withdrawal
applications in just three basins, while many others remain pending. 72 One
commentator has described the 1989 applications as "the longest running game of
freeze tag in Nevada's history."73
The SNWA was formed in 1991, replacing the Las Vegas Valley Water
District and bringing together the cities of Las Vegas, North Las Vegas,
Henderson, and Boulder City, the Big Bend Water District, and the Clark County
Water Reclamation District into one powerful water authority dominated by
Mulroy and the former Las Vegas Valley Water District.74 Modeled after the
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, the new agency was intended
"to stop parochial bickering and pursue new water supplies together."75 But for the
residents of the Snake Valley, the formation of the new SNWA set the stage for
conflict instead of cooperation.
C. Pipelines and Battle Lines: Setting the Stage for Negotiations
Getting water from the Snake Valley to Las Vegas would require a new
pipeline, and the pipeline's route would unavoidably encounter federal land.
Fortunately for Las Vegas, the city has some good friends in the United States
Senate. In 2004 Nevada's Senators Harry Reid and John Ensign inserted a clause
into the Lincoln County Conservation, Recreation, and Development Act of
2004,76 directing the federal Bureau of Land Management to release land for a
SNWA pipeline.77 However, Utah was concerned about conflicts over shared
Chinatown. See Melinda Catren & Heidi Stem, Film Review: Chinatown, NEv. LAWYER,
Sept. 2009, at 50 (reviewing CHINATOWN (Paramount Pictures, 1974)).
71 See, e.g., Great Basin Water Network v. Taylor, 222 P.3d 665 (Nev. 2010),
withdrawn after reh'g and superseded, 234 P.3d 912 (Nev. 2010); Major Nevada Water
Ruling Challenged, U.S. WATER NEWS ONLINE (Aug. 2008), http://web.archive.org/web
/20130908173012/http://www.uswaternews.com/archives/arcrights/8majoneva8.html.
72 The State Engineer granted applications for groundwater in Tikapoo Valley and
Three Lakes Valley in 2005 and Spring Valley in 2007. Hughson, supra note 38, at 65.
n Abby Johnson, The 20-Year Long Game of Freeze Tag, NEVADA APPEAL, Sept. 2,
2009, reprinted at http://www.greatbasinwater.net/news/news display.php?id=316.
7 WILLIAM FULTON, THE RELUCTANT METROPOLIS: THE POLITICS OF URBAN
GROWTH IN Los ANGELES 327-28 (2d ed. 2001); Amara Rozgus, Las Vegas, NV, Master
Plan Focuses on Regional Flood Control, Neighborhood Drainage, and Sanitary Sewers,
in CITIES AND WATER: A HANDBOOK FOR PLANNING 98 (Roger L. Kemp ed., 2009).
7 FULTON, supra note 74, at 327.
76 Pub. L. No. 108-424, § 301(e)(3), 118 Stat. 2413, 2414 (2004). For the legislative
history of the act, see 150 CONG. REC. 12,467 (2004) (introduction of bill in Senate by Sen.
Ensign and Sen. Reid); 150 CONG. REC. 20,576-82 (2004) (statements of Representatives
on bill, and passage of bill as originally introduced in House); 150 CONG. REC. 23,804-10
(2004) (statements of Representatives on bill, and concurring in the Senate amendments).
n 150 CONG. REC. S1, 113-14 (2004).
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water supplies. Thus, Utah Senator Bob Bennett inserted a clause requiring an
interstate agreement before pumping from any shared basins:
Prior to any transbasin diversion from ground-water basins located
within both the State of Nevada and the State of Utah, the State of
Nevada and the State of Utah shall reach an agreement regarding the
division of water resources of those interstate ground-water flow
system(s) from which water will be diverted and used by the project. The
agreement shall allow for the maximum sustainable beneficial use of the
water resources and protect existing water rights.
The Lincoln County Conservation, Recreation, and Development Act of 2004
also required that a federal study be conducted of the Snake Valley and
surrounding region. 7 9 The Act directed the Secretary of the Interior, through the
United States Geological Survey (USGS), Desert Research Institute (DRI), and a
designate of the State of Utah to undertake a study of the aquifers in the "basin-fill
and carbonate-rock aquifers in White Pine County, Nevada, and adjacent areas in
Nevada and Utah."8 0 The congressionally-mandated report-the Utah-Nevada
Basin and Range Carbonate-Rock Aquifer System Study (BARCASS)-was
transmitted to Congress in December 2007.81 The Bureau of Land Management
assisted USGS in the preparation of the report. 82
BARCASS examined a study area of 13,500 square miles. 83 Most
groundwater in the study area "flows through three types of aquifers-a shallow
basin-fill aquifer, a deeper volcanic-rock aquifer, and an underlying carbonate-rock
aquifer that forms the base of the ground-water flow system." 8 4 Every valley in the
study area contains basin-fill, where the primary source of groundwater in the area
is located.85 Typical basin-fill aquifer thickness in the study area is between 0.3 to
0.9 miles, with maximum thicknesses from about one mile to more than three
miles. 8 6 Some groundwater is also pumped from the carbonate-rock aquifer,
although in lesser amounts than from the basin-fill aquifer.87 The deeper volcanic-
rock aquifers "are not utilized as a significant source of water supply," although
some springs issue from them.88 The groundwater quality of the area is good,
78 Pub. L. No. 108-424, § 301(e)(3), 118 Stat. 2413, 2414 (2004).
79 Id. § 301(e)(1).
80 BARCASS, supra note 23, at 7.
81 Id
82 d
83 Id at 7, 10. See supra note 25.
84 BARCASS,supra note 23, at 1.
85 Id.
86id.
7 Id.
88 Id.
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meeting primary and secondary drinking water standards; few sampling sites
showed the presence of contaminants.9
BARCASS also measured the mean annual natural discharge-the amount of
groundwater annually consumed by evapotranspiration-of the various
hydrographic areas in the study area.90 The study determined that the highest
annual recharge occurs in Steptoe Valley (154,000 acre-feet) and Snake Valley
(about 111,000 acre-feet); the highest annual discharge occurs in Snake Valley
(about 132,000 acre-feet) and Steptoe Valley (about 101,000 acre-feet). 91
The Steptoe Valley recharge and Snake Valley discharge rates are
significantly higher than previously estimated.92 The study found significant
interbasin groundwater flow, which causes differences in discharge and recharge
rates in the valleys. 9 3 In five of the twelve hydrographic areas studied, recharge
exceeds discharge (before any groundwater resources development) by 10,000
acre-feet or more on an average annual basis; this was most pronounced in Steptoe
Valley, where recharge exceeds discharge by 53,000 acre-feet. Conversely, in two
of the hydrographic areas studied, including the Snake Valley, discharge exceeds
recharge by 10,000 acre-feet or more on an average annual basis. In the remaining
four hydrographic areas, there is no pronounced difference between recharge and
discharge rates. 94
BARCASS reported that the carbonate rocks of the Egan, Schnell, Creek, and
Snake mountain ranges, combined with the high precipitation and recharge rates of
the area, make these ranges the source of "a large mound that is a primary source
of recharge" for all three aquifer types in the area. 95 The direction and source of
groundwater flow differs according to location; the primary source areas for
groundwater flow to the Snake Valley are the Schnell Creek and Snake ranges,
from which groundwater flows in a northeasterly direction. 96 The study found that
the majority of the groundwater flow exits the study area through the White River
Valley (39,000 acre-feet per year), followed by the Snake Valley (29,000 acre-feet
per year), Tippett Valley (12,000 acre-feet per year), and Butte Valley (8,000 acre-
feet per year).97
BARCASS found that average annual groundwater recharge of the study area
is 530,000 acre-feet, and average annual discharge under predevelopment
conditions was 440,000 acre-feet, with the difference indicating that some 90,000
acre-feet of groundwater "exits the study area annually by subsurface outflow." 98
89 Id. at 2.
90 Id. at 60.
91 Id at 2.
92 Id. at 4.
93 id.
94id
9Id. at 5.
96id.
7 Id.
98 Id. at 6.
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The study found that current new regional groundwater use for the study was about
80,000 acre-feet. This figure includes the volume of water pumped from wells or
diverted from springs, but excludes water that was pumped or diverted and
subsequently returned. 99
Starting in 2005, Nevada and Utah entered into nonpublic negotiations to
apportion the water, eventually reaching a proposed agreement four years later.'00
Under the terms of the proposed Snake Valley Agreement, 0 ' unappropriated water
would be essentially split evenly between the two states; an extensive
environmental protection and water management scheme would be implemented;
and provisions were made for ongoing data collection, monitoring, and dispute
resolution. 102
But with opposition from Utahns who saw the Snake Valley Agreement as a
losing deal for Utah,10 3 Utah Governor Gary Herbert delayed signing the
document. 1 On April 3, 2013, after nearly four years of delay, Governor Herbert
announced that he would not sign the Snake Valley Agreement, stating that "[a]
majority of local residents do not support the agreement with Nevada. Therefore, I
cannot in good conscience sign the agreement because I won't impose a solution
on those most impacted that they themselves cannot support" and saying that
"[t]here is no more complex and emotional issue with which I have grappled as
governor of this great state."' 05 The reaction in Utah was "universally ecstatic,"'10
6
with one opponent stating that Herbert "summoned his inner Churchill." 07
The political failure of the Agreement did not come as a surprise, given the
depth of opposition led by a broad and politically powerful coalition of water
consumers such as ranchers and farmers, environmentalists, and media and
community leaders. Governor Herbert noted that the Snake Valley Agreement was
99 Id.
100 Patty Henetz, Did Utah Blink in Snake Valley Talks?, SALT LAKE TRIB. Oct. 19,
2009, http://www.sltrib.com/news/ci 13596248.
101 Final Proposed Agreement, supra note 10, at 6-12.
102 Id; see infra Part II.B.
103 See infra Part II.C.
4 E.g., Patty Henetz, Herbert Agrees to 'Go Slow' on Snake Valley Water Deal,
SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 16, 2009, http://www.sltrib.com/utah/ci_13802723; Patty Henetz,
Herbert Pulling Back on Water Deal, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 8, 2010, http://www.sltrib.
com/news/ci 14152206.
105 Press Release, Office of the Utah Governor, Governor Will Not Sign Snake Valley
Water Agreement (Apr. 3, 2013), www.utah.gov/governor/newsmedia/article.html?article
=8675. See also Christopher Smart et al., Herbert Rejects Snake Valley Water Pact With
Nevada, SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 4, 2013, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/56090274-
78/valley-agreement-snake-utah.html.csp.
1o6 Amy Joi O'Donoghue, Gov. Gary Herbert Won't Sign Snake Valley Water-
Sharing Agreement, DESERET NEWS, Apr. 3, 2013, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/86
5577375/Herbert-wont-sign-Snake-Valley-water-sharing-agreement.html.
107 Brian Moench, No End to Nevada's Quest for Water, SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 6,
2013, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/opinion/56107724-82/utah-nevada-erionite-las.html.csp.
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"complex," a "tough issue, and fraught with emotion," stating that "only a handful
of water attorneys understand the complexity and legal ramifications of it.',,
08
II. A NEW MODEL FOR TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFER MANAGEMENT
Despite the Snake Valley Agreement's political death, the Agreement
presents an ideal model for cooperatively managing an interstate aquifer and
provides a superior alternative to equitable-apportionment litigation.
The first section of this Part examines the benefits of cooperation over
conflict in interstate water disputes, as seen in the many interstate-compact regimes
that allocate and manage interstate surface water resources, from the Colorado
River to the Great Lakes. While these compacts are not focused on groundwater,
some do address groundwater resources that are hydrologically connected to the
subject surface water system, and the surface water compacts can also provide
general guidance on structuring an interstate water agreement. The second section
of this Part examines the specific provisions of the Snake Valley Agreement,
designed to foster cooperative groundwater management, avoid injury to existing
permitted users, minimize environmental impacts, and maximize the water
available for beneficial use in each state.
A. Interstate Compacts and Groundwater
A compact is best understood as a contract between states, subject to federal
approval. 109 Article I, section 10, of the United States Constitution provides the
authority and process for interstate compacts, stating: "No State shall, without the
Consent of Congress . .. enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State,
or with a foreign Power . . . ."110 Interstate compacts are typically negotiated by
governors and other state agency officials, but enactment of a compact requires
legislative approval. Once a compact has been approved by Congress and signed
into law by the President, it becomes effective and has the full force and
supremacy of federal law."' States' duties and commitments in a federally
approved compact can be enforced in federal court." 2
108 Paul Foy, Utah Governor Agonizing over Nevada's Water Play, ASSOCIATED
PRESs, Mar. 29, 2013, http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2013-03-29/utah-governor-agon
izing-over-nevadas-water-play (reporting statement of Gov. Herbert on March 29, 2013).
109 See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987).
110 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
"' See Culyer v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438 (1981) (stating that "congressional
consent transforms an interstate compact . . . into a law of the United States"). "Although
the Compact Clause itself requires only the consent of Congress," usually given in the form
of a statute or a joint resolution, "'settled usage' has granted the President veto power over
consent," as the president usually has with ordinary bills and joint resolutions. Note,
Charting No Man's Land: Applying Jurisdictional and Choice of Law Doctrines to
Interstate Compacts, Ill Harv. L. Rev. 1991, 1993 (1998). "[T]he threat of a presidential
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"There are [currently] twenty-seven interstate compacts for managing and
allocating surface water resources . . . in the United States."ll 3 The Great Lakes,'l4
the Colorado River,' 15 the Rio Grande, 1 6 the Arkansas River,' 17 the Susquehanna
River,'18 and the Delaware River" 9 are all subject to interstate compacts. Surface
water compacts vary as much as the waterbodies they address, but generally follow
one of two approaches. 120 Western interstate water compacts tend to simply divide
the waters by volume between the watershed states.121 Eastern interstate water
compacts tend to provide for more comprehensive regulation and management of
water uses.122
While no interstate compacts to date have focused on groundwater,12 3 some
do address groundwater resources that are hydrologically connected to the subject
veto has occasionally been an obstacle to compact formation." Id. at 1994 n. 19 (citing
FREDERICK L. ZIMMERMANN & MITCHELL WENDELL, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT SINCE
1925, at 94 (1951); and FREDERICK L. ZIMMERMANN & MITCHELL WENDELL, THE LAW
AND USE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS 16-17 (1976)), available at http://www.csg.org/
knowledgecenter/docs/ncic/LawAndUse.pdf). This presidential power to veto interstate
compacts appears to have been actually exercised only once, when President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt vetoed the Republican River Compact in 1942. Emanuel Celler,
Congress, Compacts, and Interstate Authorities, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 682, 686
n.28 (citing H.R. Doc. No. 690, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942)); Jill Elaine Hasday, Interstate
Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Problem of Permanency, 49 FLA. L. REv. 1, 12-
14, 22 & nn.51, 59 (1997).
112 See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. at 124, 128 (1987).
113 Hall, supra note 2, at 254.
114 Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, Pub. L. No.
110-342, 122 Stat. 3739 (2008) [hereinafter Great Lakes Compact].
" Colorado River Compact, 70 CONG. REC. 324 (1928).
116 Rio Grande Compact, Pub. L. No. 76-96, 53 Stat. 785 (1939).
" Arkansas River Compact, Pub. L. No. 81-82, 63 Stat. 145 (1949); Arkansas River
Basin Compact of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-789, 80 Stat. 1409 (1966); Arkansas River Basin
Compact of 1970, Pub. L. No. 93-152, 87 Stat. 569 (1973).
1" Susquehanna River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-575, 84 Stat. 1509 (1970).
19 Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961)
[hereinafter Delaware River Compact].
120 See Nathan C. Johnson, Comment, Protecting Our Water Compacts: The Looming
Threat of Unilateral Congressional Interaction, 2010 Wis. L. REv. 875, 888 (2010)
("Interstate water compacts . . . have historically taken two forms: western and eastern.
Western compacts . . . take a limited water resource and divide it up into agreed upon
allocations among the compacting states. Conversely, eastern compacts take a different
approach-one similar to other modem compacts-and are created around centralized
management authorities.")
121 Id.; see, e.g., Colorado River Compact, supra note 115, at 325; Rio Grande
Compact, supra note 116.
122. Johnson, supra note 120, at 888; see, e.g., Great Lakes Compact, supra note 114,
at 3744; Delaware River Compact, supra note 119, at 691.
123 See Hall, supra note 2, at 255-56.
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surface-water system.124 The Supreme Court in recent years has on several
occasions found that specific interstate water compacts covered not only surface
water, but also hydrologically connected groundwater, even though none of the
compacts at issue expressly mentioned "groundwater."1 2 5 Given the emergence of
interstate groundwater disputes, piggybacking groundwater management on an
existing surface water compact may not be ideal. Instead, states should look to the
provisions of the proposed Snake Valley Aquifer Agreement as a model for
sustainable interstate groundwater management.
B. The Snake Valley Aquifer Agreement
The final proposed Agreement for Management of the Snake Valley
Groundwater System (Agreement)12 6 was issued following seven public hearings
and more than two hundred submitted comments on a draft Agreement released on
August 13, 2009.127 The Agreement, a thirteen-page document with three
appendices, lays out in detail a new scheme of water management in the Snake
Valley. 128 The Agreement would have crystallized a commitment by both states "to
work cooperatively to . . . resolve present or future controversies" over Snake
Valley groundwater; "assure the quantity and quality of the Available Groundwater
Supply;" "minimize the injury to Existing Permitted Users;" "minimize
environmental impacts;" "maximize the water available for Beneficial Use in each
State;" and "manage the hydrologic basin as a whole."1 2 9 Importantly, "[t]he
Agreement does not grant any water rights"; rather, it "merely allocates the Snake
Valley groundwater resources between the two States, and provides for the joint
124 See, e.g., Great Lakes Compact, supra note 114; Delaware River Basin Compact,
supra note 119.
125 Barton H. Thompson, Beyond Connections: Pursuing Multidimensional
Conjunctive Management, 47 IDAHO L. REv. 273, 282 (2011) (citing Kansas v. Colorado,
543 U.S. 86, 90-91 (2004) (interpreting the 1949 Arkansas River Compact); First Interim
Report of the Special Master at 43-54, Montana v. Wyoming, 552 U.S. 1175 (2010) (No.
137, Original), 2010 WL 4111634 at *43-54 (interpreting the 1950 Yellowstone River
Compact); First Report of the Special Master at 44-45, Kansas v. Nebraska, 530 U.S. 1272
(2000) (No. 126), 2000 WL 3578999, at *44-45 (interpreting the 1942 Republican River
Compact)).
126 Final Proposed Agreement, supra note 10.
127 Utah/Nevada Snake Valley Agreement, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF
LAND MGMT., http://www.blm.gov/nv/st/en/prog/planning/groundwater_projects/water rig
hts home/utahnevadadraft.html; RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENTS RECEIVED BY THE
STATES OF NEVADA AND UTAH ON THE AGREEMENT FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE SNAKE
VALLEY GROUNDWATER SYSTEM AND THE SNAKE VALLEY ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING
AND MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT, UTAH Div. OF WATER RIGHTS 9, [hereinafter RESPONSE
TO PUBLIC COMMENTS], available at http://waterrights.utah.gov/snakeValleyAgreement/
comments.pdf.
128 See generally Final Proposed Agreement, supra note 10.
129 Id. § 4.8.
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management of the aquifer," preserving the statutory discretion (and, under certain
conditions, the statutory duty) of the state engineers of both Utah and Nevada to
deny permits for withdrawals at points within the borders of the engineers'
respective states.130 In other words, the Agreement provides a baseline for
environmental protection; it would not have been the "last word" on water
management and would not preempt or impair the state engineers' authority to
deny applications not in the public interest.'131
The Agreement was strengthened by the federal participation behind it. It is
well recognized that consultation with relevant federal authorities is a best practice
in negotiating interstate agreements.132 The Snake Valley Agreement, like other
interstate agreements, preserves traditional state authority while taking advantage
of a strong federal aegis;13 3 the negotiation was carried out under a congressional
130 RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 127, at 8.
131 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.370 (2)-(3) (LexisNexis 2012). This
provision provides that "the State Engineer shall reject [an] application [for water
withdrawals] and refuse to issue the requested permit" where "there is no unappropriated
water in the proposed source of supply, or where its proposed use or change conflicts with
existing rights or- with protectable interests . . . or threatens to prove detrimental to the
public interest." Id. "In addition to the criteria set forth [elsewhere in the statute], in
determining whether an application for an interbasin transfer of groundwater must be
rejected pursuant to this section, the State Engineer shall consider" various conservation
factors, including "[w]hether the proposed action is environmentally sound as it relates to
the basin from which the water is exported." Id. See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8(1)(b)
(LexisNexis 2012). The Utah provision provides that "if the state engineer ... has reason to
believe that an application to appropriate water . . . will unreasonably affect public
recreation or the natural stream environment, or will prove detrimental to the public
welfare, it is the state engineer's duty to withhold approval or rejection of the application
until the state engineer has investigated the matter" and "[i]f an application does not meet
the requirements of this section, it shall be rejected." Id. On "the power [of state engineers]
to reject applications that are contrary to the public interest," see generally TARLOCK, supra
note 7 at § 5:52.
132 NAT'L CTR. FOR INTERSTATE COMPACTS, COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS,
UNDERSTANDING INTERSTATE COMPACTS 1, available at http://www.cglg.org/projects/
water/CompactEducation/UnderstandingInterstateCompacts--CSGNCIC.pdf (suggesting
that interstate compacts allow states to "[riespond to national priorities in consultation or in
partnership with the federal government.").
3 The federal government can provide valuable financial resources, information-
gathering expertise, and technical assistance-as well as institutional prestige-to states as
they negotiate and implement interstate agreements. Marlissa S. Briggett, Comment, State
Supremacy in the Federal Realm: The Interstate Compact, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
751, 763-64 (1991) ("Federal cooperation in interstate compacts offers significant
advantages over pure interstate compacts without such federal participation."). See also
Note, Congress and the Port of New York Authority: Congressional Supervision of
Interstate Compacts, 70 YALE L.J. 812, 819 (1961) ("Interstate agreements often deal with
multistate problems which might otherwise be considered the responsibility of the federal
government. State officials who negotiate interstate agreements are frequently aware ofthis
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directive to come to an agreement, 1 34 a comprehensive federal study informed the
negotiations, 135 federal agencies actively participated in the public-comment
phase, 136 and the Agreement envisaged federal participation in environmental
monitoring and management.137 This federal participation within the state-led
process likely helped refine the Agreement draft. Like other aspects of the Snake
Valley Agreement, this should be emulated in future interstate water disputes.
1. General and Interpretive Provisions
The Agreement contained a number of interpretative and general provisions
that explain its purpose and limit its scope. The preamble to the Agreement stated
that it is "intended to define the water resource management responsibilities" of the
states in the Snake Valley groundwater basin, to "define a framework for
cooperation between the states" on associated natural resource issues, and to fulfill
the 2004 congressional directive to "reach an agreement regarding the division of
water resources, protection of existing water rights, and the maximum sustainable
use of the waters prior to any interbasin transfer from groundwater basins located
within both states." 38 Before laying out its substantive provisions, the Agreement
defines fourteen terms and phrases1 3 9 and lays out a number of "findings." 40
The Agreement expressly disclaimed being an interstate compact, defining
itself instead as a "state-to-state agreement" explicitly adopted "with the intention
of avoiding an equitable apportionment action regarding the Snake Valley
Groundwater Basin" in the Supreme Court. 14 1 While the political death of the
Agreement makes the point moot, the lack of congressional approval could have
undermined the enforceability of the Agreement had it been enacted outside of the
constitutional compact process. 142 If the Agreement had been entered into,
fact, and may be induced to act, in part, by a desire to preserve traditional state authority
over the problem area.").
134 See supra notes 76-79.
3 See supra notes 80-99.
136 See Final Proposed Agreement, supra note 10, at § 5.5; infra note 198 and
accompanying text.
137 See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
138 Fin4l Proposed Agreement, supra note 10, at pmbl.139 Id. § 1 (providing for definition of various significant terms, including "adverse
impact to an existing permitted use," "available groundwater supply," "beneficial use," and
"consumptive use").
140 Id. § 2.6 (acknowledging, e.g., that "recharge of the Snake Valley aquifer occurs
primarily in Nevada, while groundwater discharge and consumption use has historically
occurred primarily in Utah.").
141 Id. at pmbl.
142 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 468-69 (1978); see
also Claire Carothers, Note, United We Stand: The Interstate Compact as a Tool for
Effecting Climate Change, 41 GA. L. REv. 229, 234-36, 250 (2006) (noting that the "the
lack of identification with a formal compact structure . . . increases the difficulty in
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however, it might have been found to be a valid compact because Congress's 2004
directive to Utah and Nevada to mutually agree1 4 3 could be viewed as implied
congressional authorization for the states to enter into a groundwater compact.
While the political process for compact approval can be daunting, the legal
status of the resulting interstate compact typically justifies the effort and would be
an ideal approach for the party states to pursue.
The Agreement provided that its provisions are binding on all the parties'
.successors in interest;14 5 that nothing in the Agreement "shall be deemed to alter,
amend or supersede the . . . statutory or administrative authorities of the State
Engineers"l46 or to create any private right of action by or benefit of third
parties; 14 7 that the Agreement would become effective immediately upon execution
identifying and classifying the nature of the agreement," and suggesting that interstate
agreements are "not likely to escape characterization as a compact" merely by
characterizing the agreement as a "memorandum of understanding" or similar); David E.
Engdahl, Characterization of Interstate Arrangements: When Is a Compact Not a
Compact?, 64 MICH. L. REV. 63, 70-71 (1965); Todd Jefferson Hartley, Handshake Deals:
The Future of Informal State Agreements and the Interstate Compacts Clause, 22 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 91, 126 (2011) (suggesting that interstate "handshake deals ... which
establish sufficiently weighty regulatory schemes are simply not constitutional without
federal approval"); Hasday, supra note 111, at 11- 12 (1997) ("Every interstate agreement
must win the approval of the party state legislatures, but only some interstate agreements
are compacts, directly bound to the compact jurisprudence on permanency and
constitutionally required to gamer congressional as well as state assent. Only those
agreements that may 'encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United
States' must take the compact form and receive Congress' consent.") (quoting U.S. Steel
Corp., 434 U.S. at 468); Matthew Pincus, When Should Interstate Compacts Require
Congressional Consent?, 42 CoLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBs. 511, 522-37 (2009) (describing
and critiquing the U.S. Steel test).
143 See supra note notes 76-79.
144 In Cuyler v. Adams, the Supreme Court found that "Congress may consent to an
interstate compact by authorizing joint state action in advance," as well as "by giving
expressed or implied approval to an agreement the States have already joined." 449 U.S.
433, 441 (1981); accord U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 485 ("Congressional consent may also be
given in advance of the adoption of any specific compacts, by general consent
resolutions . . . ."). The pre-approval of Congress has been given several times. E.g., Weeks
Act, ch. 186, 36 Stat. 961 (1911) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 552 (2006)) (forest and navigable
river conservation); Crime Control Consent Act of 1934, ch. 406, 48 Stat. 909 (1934)
(codified at 4 U.S.C. § 112(a)(2006)) (crime prevention and enforcement); Act of Apr. 25,
1936 (Tobacco Control Act of 1936), ch. 249, 49 Stat. 1239 (1936); Federal Civil Defense
Act of 1950, ch. 1228, 64 Stat. 1245, 1249 (1951) (civil defense); Act of Aug. 11, 1959,
Pub. L. No. 86-154, 73 Stat. 333 (1959) (development or operation of airport facilities).
145 Final Proposed Agreement, supra note 10, at § 8.7.
.14 6 Id. § 9.1.
147 Id. § 9.4.
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by the states;148 that the individuals executing the Agreement were duly authorized
to do so;14 9 that modifications, amendments, or terminations of the Agreement
would be binding only if evidenced in writing and signed by each state;' 50 and that
all notices concerning the Agreement would be sent via United States Mail to the
state engineers.5"' Under the Agreement, both states agreed that "the State
Engineers are vested with the exclusive jurisdiction to administer the terms" of the
Agreement and would "make and enforce such regulations within their respective
State as may be necessary to enable compliance" with the Agreement.15 2
2. Water Classification and Management Scheme
Under the Agreement, both states would have accepted the study conducted
by the USGS in accordance with 2004 congressional mandate as "the best
currently available scientific evidence of the hydrology of Snake Valley, and ...
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of the general allocation water within this
[a]greement."l 53 The Agreement adopts the study's determination that the "amount
of groundwater annually consumed by evapotranspiration in Snake Valley"-that
is, the annual natural discharge of the basin-is 132,000 acre-feet per year.' 5 4 The
Agreement defined the "available groundwater supply" as the "total amount of
[g]roundwater available for appropriation and use on an annual basis from the
Snake Valley Groundwater Basin," as determined by the Agreement or by future
agreement of the state engineers of both states.'5 5 "In an effort to be conservative
in the protection of the Groundwater of Snake Valley, and to proceed cautiously in
the development of future Groundwater resources," the States agreed that the
available groundwater supply as of the date of the Agreement was 108,000 acre-
feet per year.156 The Agreement then triages the available groundwater supply
water into three categories, and equally divides the total between the two States.
148 Id. § 9.3; cf Doe v. Penn. Bd. of Probation & Parole, 513 F.3d 95, 103-07 (3d Cir.
2008) (holding that an interstate compact does not create a private federal right of action
and that a private individual was not a third-party beneficiary with enforceable rights under
the compact in the absence of the states' intent, whether explicit or inferred from the
compact's term, to create such rights).
149 Final Proposed Agreement, supra note 10, at § 9.6.
'
50 Id. § 9.5.
1s1 Id. § 9.7.
152 Id. § 4.3.
5 Id. § 3.1 (referring to BARCASS).
154 Id.; Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,398, 35,407
(proposed June 22, 2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-06-22/html
/2010-15070.htm.
15 Final Proposed Agreement, supra note 10, at § 1.3.56 Id. § 3.2.
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Allocated groundwater is groundwater water "solely for satisfaction of water
rights" in the area "with a priority date prior to October 17, 1989.",57 "Unrecorded
diligence claims" that are subsequently recognized are counted as allocated.158 The
1989 date is significant, because this was the date the Las Vegas Valley Water
District, the predecessor to the Southern Nevada Water Authority (SNWA), filed
147 applications with the Nevada State Engineer.159
Under the Agreement, "no new appropriations will be permitted under the
Allocated Category," although change applications seeking to move existing spring
or surface rights to groundwater may be allowed. 160 The Agreement finds that
water set aside in the Snake Valley for existing rights with a priority date prior to
October 1989 comprises 55,000 acre-feet per year in Utah and 12,000 acre-feet per
year in Nevada.161 In explicitly protecting existing users' rights to use and enjoy
water, the Agreement avoids potential takings claims.' 6 2
Unallocated groundwater is groundwater that, under the Agreement, the state
engineers of both states would have been free to appropriate in accordance with the
law of their respective states.163 This category includes rights with a priority date
after October 17, 1989.164 Under the Agreement, Utah would have received 6,000
acre-feet per year and Nevada would have received 35,000 acre-feet per year in
unallocated water.165
Reserved groundwater is groundwater for which the state engineers "shall not
grant any . . . withdrawal permits" unless the state engineers jointly agree,
"following analyses of peer-reviewed data . . ., that additional groundwater can
safely and sustainably be withdrawn from the Snake Valley Groundwater Basin,
and -that holders of permits to use water from the Allocated and Unallocated
categories in this Agreement will not be unreasonably affected."' 66 Under the
57 Id. § 5. 1.
158 Id. An unrecorded diligence claim, under Utah water law, is a water-rights claim
arising from beneficial use prior to the establishment of the state engineer permitting
system. "[I]n 1935, groundwater rights were included for the first time in the State
Engineer's appropriation application system," and so "groundwater rights acquired by
beneficial use alone prior to 1935 are valid, even though not of record." R.L. Knuth,
Conveyancing and Collateralizing Utah Water Rights, 12 UTAH B.J. 12, 12 (1999).
1 Final Proposed Agreement, supra note 10, at § 2.12; see supra text accompanying
notes 63-73.
160 Final Proposed Agreement, supra note 10, at § 5.1.
161 Id §4.2, tbl.1.
162 See generally James H. Davenport & Craig Bell, Governmental Interference with
the Use of Water: When Do Unconstitutional "Takings" Occur? 9 U. DENV. WATER L.
REv. 1 (2005) (discussing when government actions that interfere with private water rights
constitute takings of private property that require just compensation).
163 Final Proposed Agreement, supra note 10, at § 5.2.
164 Id.
16  Id. § 4.2, tbl.1.
166 Id. §§3.3, 5.3.
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Agreement, Utah would have been granted 5,000 acre-feet per year, and Nevada
19,000 acre-feet per year, in reserved groundwater supply.167
Under this careful tripartite division of water, therefore, water would have
been equally divided between the two States. A full implementation of the
agreement would have seen both Utah and Nevada receive 66,000 acre-feet per
year. 6 8 This careful, equal division of water between the States was balanced with
the Agreement's flexible allocation of water based on future cooperative scientific
study. These principles in the Agreement would have fulfilled the congressional
mandate to "equitably divide the water, protect existing water rights in both States
and provide for the maximum sustainable beneficial use" of the Snake Valley
Aquifer. 169 The States' negotiating teams stated that this was the central issue in
the negotiations and acknowledged that the allocation was "the subject of intense
debate."1 7 0 Utah and Nevada, the negotiators said, "each made various concessions
to narrow the gap on their differences," and "[a]s with all negotiations, in the end
neither State received the full amount of water it desired." 7 1 In the end, taking into
account the other side's position and the scientific evidence, the parties agreed that
an even split of available water would be a fair division.172
Under the Agreement, Nevada would have agreed "to hold the [SNWA]
Applications in abeyance through September 1, 2019"; the Nevada State Engineer
would neither hold a hearing nor grant a permit on these applications prior to that
date.173 This ten-year period would allow time for "additional hydrologic, biologic,
and other data to be collected."1 74 The Agreement further provided that at least
nine months before the Nevada State Engineer held a hearing on the SNWA
applications, Utah and Nevada would confer, and any Utah state employees that
the states agreed had "relevant information regarding the hydrologic, biologic, and
environment resources of Snake Valley" would be invited by Nevada "to present
such information during the hearing on the SNWA Applications."7  Under the
Agreement, Nevada also would have agreed to "provide public notice, at least one
year prior to the export of Groundwater from Snake Valley and at least once each
16 Id. § 4.2, tbl.2.
As the text accompanying notes 161 to 167 lays out, if fully implemented, Utah
would have received 55,000 acre-feet per year in allocated groundwater, 6,000 acre-feet
per year in unallocated groundwater, and 5,000 acre-feet per year in reserved groundwater,
for a total of 66,000 acre-feet per year. Nevada would have received 12,000 acre-feet per
year in allocated groundwater, 35,000 acre-feet per year in unallocated groundwater, and
19,000 acre-feet per year in reserved groundwater, also for a total of 66,000 acre-feet per
year.
169 RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 127, at 5.
170 id
"7 Id. at 6.
172 id
173 Final Proposed Agreement, supra note 10, at § 8.1.
174 d
7s Id. § 8.2.
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quarter following the commencement of such export, that any owner of an Existing
Permitted Use may notify SNWA of a claim to an [a]dverse [i]mpact to its water
right" arising from SNWA groundwater withdrawals. 176
The Agreement provided that if any permits were granted pursuant to the
SNWA applications, SNWA would establish a mitigation fund for as long as
SNWA maintained groundwater development or withdrawal facilities in Snake
Valley.177 The fund would be "sufficient to accomplish the mitigation of any
reasonably anticipatable Adverse Impact," but at no time would have a balance of
below $3 million. 78 In response to public comments, the states made clear that the
$3 million figure "is in no way intended to quantify" or act as a limitation upon
funding made by SNWA "to prevent or mitigate damages"; rather, the $3 million is
the sum "to be immediately available to address or cure any impairment problems
due to SNWA's pumping." 79 The states agreed that the Fund would have been
managed according to Governmental Accounting Standards Board principles.' 80
The Agreement contained a detailed procedure for claims of an adverse
impact from any groundwater withdrawals. The Agreement provided that any
existing permitted-use owner who believed that a groundwater withdrawal by
SNWA caused an adverse impact to the owner's existing permitted use could
notify SNWA of its claim.i'8 If the well or spring at the point of diversion of the
existing permitted use was "not currently producing sufficient water to meet the
immediate needs of the permit owner," then under the Agreement the SNWA
would be obligated to "provide qualified staff to meet in person with the permit
owner" within ten business days.182 If the well or spring that was the subject of the
adverse-impact claim was currently producing sufficient water to meet the needs of
the permit holder, then SNWA was obligated to respond within thirty days.' 83 In
either case, if the SNWA determined that an adverse impact either occurred or was
likely to occur, it was obligated to "make an offer, binding on [SNWA], to the
owner of the Existing Permitted Use to mitigate the Adverse Impact." 84 The
Agreement contained a nonexhaustive list of possible mitigation options that could
be offered, including "[r]edistributing [g]roundwater withdrawals geographically,"
"[r]educing or ceasing [g]roundwater withdrawals at specific points of diversion,"
deepening wells, "repairing or replacing pumps and other infrastructure, and
reimbursing for increased pumping costs," "[p]roviding alternate water supplies,"
and "[a]ugmenting water supply for senior rights and resources using surface and
176 Id. § 8.3.
'
77 Id. § 8.5.
178 id.
179 RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 127, at 8.
80 d. § 8.5.
181 Id. § 8.4.
182 Id. § 8.4(a).
183 Id. § 8.4(b).
184 Id. § 8.4.
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Groundwater sources."' 85 The agreement provided that within ten days from either
determining that no adverse impact occurred or would occur, or a rejection by any
owner of a SNWA's final offer to mitigate, the SNWA would "notify both State
Engineers of such determination or rejeciion," providing in writing "all pertinent
details." 1 6
The Agreement also would have provided adequate protections to the interests
in water held by the Confederated Tribes of the Goshute Reservation and Ely
Shoshone Tribe of Nevada, two federally recognized tribes who made public
comments on the draft agreement.' 8 7 The state acknowledged the federal reserved
water rights held by the Goshute and Ely Shoshone.' 88 But "there is little chance
that" either the surface water rights of Goshute, "fed by snowmelt high in the Deep
Creek Mountains," or water rights of the Ely Shoshone, "for their reservation in
Steptoe Valley near Ely," would "be adversely affected" or impaired in any way
"by any additional groundwater pumping in Snake Valley."l89 Even if some
unforeseen adverse impacts on the tribes' rights did occur, the protections of the
Agreement and federal and state law would still be in place to provide an adequate
remedy for both the Goshute and Ely Shoshone.' 90
3. Monitoring and Environmental Protections
The Agreement contained several layers of monitoring and environmental
provisions. The most fundamental eilvironmental restrictions were provided for in
Section 5 of the Agreement. One part of Section 5 would have prohibited (1)
groundwater mining or overdrafting (i.e., extracting groundwater beyond the
aquifer's safe yield); (2) the impairment of groundwater quality; and (3) the
185Id.
1 86 id.
187 RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 127, at 12-13; Letter from Alvin S.
Marques, Chairman, Ely Shoshone Tribe, to Allen Biaggi, Director, Nev. Dep't of
Conservation & Natural Res. (Sept. 29, 2009), available at http://waterrights.utah.gov/
snakeValleyAgreement/comments/m027.pdf (designated Comment No. 27); Confederated
Tribes of the Goshute Reservation, Concerns on the Snake Valley Water Settlement,
available at http://waterrights.utah.gov/snakeValleyAgreement/comments/c 175.pdf
(designated Comment No. 175). See also Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to
Receive Services from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,868, 47,869 (Aug. 10,
2012) (listing federally recognized tribal entities, along with official names and states).
188 RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 127, at 12-13. On the doctrine of
Indian reserved water rights generally, see Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908);
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (Arizona 1); and A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF
WATER RIGHTS AND RES. §§ 9:38-:50 (2011). It should be noted that "[t]he Supreme Court
has never expressly extended Winters to groundwater, but little, if any, doubt remains that
Indian tribes have groundwater as well as surface water rights." TARLOCK, supra, note 7
§ 9:42 (collecting authorities).
189 RESPONSE TO PUBLIc COMMENTS, supra note 127, at 12, 13.
190 d
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degradation of the physical integrity of the groundwater basin (i.e., compaction of
surfaces).191 The second major environmental protection in Section 5 provided that
"[t]he State Engineers, pursuant to their powers to administer the water in their
respective states, shall condition approval of any application for interbasin transfer
of water from Snake Valley . .. in excess of 1,000 afy" on (1) compliance with the
Snake Valley Environmental Monitoring and Management Agreement (EMMA);
(2) "the establishment of a process to protect [e]xisting [p]ermitted [u]ses from
[a]dverse [i]mpacts;" and (c) the requirement "that all wells be equipped with
access ports of sufficient diameter to allow the measurement of the water levels
therein," or some similar "reliable means to easily obtain water level data."' 92 The
states stressed, in response to a "generally positive" public comment made by U.S.
Department of the Interior agencies, that while the Agreement does contain many
provisions aimed at mitigating adverse impacts, the Agreement also seeks to avoid
adverse impacts in the first instance.193
The EMMA was appended to the Agreement as Appendix C.194 The EMMA
was to be entered into by both states and by the SNWA concurrently with the main
Agreement. The EMMA provided for the coordination of environmental
monitoring and management agreements and for ongoing cooperative monitoring
of biological, hydrologic, and air quality data.'95 Specifically, the EMMA created a
multidisciplinary Technical Working Group (TWG) to study and make
recommendationsl96 and a Management Committee of two executive-level
principals of either party to review and approve, disapprove, or modify
recommendations from the TWG.197 Both states expressed, in responses to public
comments, a willingness to have nonvoting representation of federal environmental
agencies on the TWG, and particularly, "given its statutory duties regarding the
191 Final Proposed Agreement, supra note 10, at para. 5.4.
192 Id. para. 5.5.
193 RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 127, at 11-12 (responding to Letter
from Stephen R. Palmer, Office of the Reg'1 Solicitor, U.S. Dep't of the Interior (for the
Bureau of Land Mgmt. & U.S. Fish & Wildlife Srv.) & Peter A. Fahmy, Office of the
Solicitor, Div. of Parks & Wildlife, U.S. Dep't of the Interior (Nat'l Park Srv.), to Utah
Dep't of Natural Res. & Nev. Dep't of Conservation & Natural Res. (Oct. 2, 2009),
available at http://waterrights.utah.gov/snakeValleyAgreement/comments/cl97_01.pdf
(designated as Comment No. 197)).
194 Utah and Nevada variously referred to this component of the Agreement as the
Environmental Monitoring and Management Agreement ("EMM Agreement") and the
Snake Valley Monitoring, Mitigation and Management Plan ("3M Plan"). For brevity, we
refer to it in this Article simply as EMMA.
195 Snake Valley Environmental Monitoring and Management Agreement, para. G,
http://water.nv.gov/hearings/past/snake/documents/SnakeValley EnvironmentalManage
ment Agreement.pdf [hereinafter EMMA].
96 Id. § 3.2.
97Id. § 3.1.
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implementation of the Endangered Species Act," a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services
representative.198
The EMMA mandated that the Utah-Nevada joint Management Committee
would create a Management Response and Operation Plan before any diversion of
groundwater by the SNWA could take place.199 The Operation Plan would include
"identification and definition of early warning indicators for effects to hydrologic,
biologic, and air resources in the Area of Interest;" "[a] defined range of specific
management response actions designed to" (1) avoid, (2) minimize, and (3)
mitigate indicated effects; "[a] process for the TWG and Management Committee
to review the early warning indicators" and determine the appropriate resource;
and a process to evaluate and monitor the results of all management response
actions.200 The EMMA included a nonexclusive list of possible "management
response actions," including geographically redistributing groundwater
withdrawals; reducing or ceasing groundwater withdrawals, augmenting water
supply, and acquiring water rights; or acquiring property or water rights for the
recovery of certain Special Status Species.201 The parties agreed "that no
management response action may be selected which" (1) could negatively impact
the Conservation Agreements and Strategies for the least chub and Columbia
spotted frog; (2) "otherwise causes the existing viable population of a species to
decline to an extent which necessitates the species come under the purview of the
Endangered Species Act," or (3) "causes or contributes significantly to a violation
of an applicable National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) standard or
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) increment." 2 0 2
The EMMA provided that SNWA and Utah would make a good-faith effort to
create an Operation Plan within one year from the beginning of the "baseline
period," which begins when the SNWA provides notice to Utah that it plans to
begin withdrawing groundwater from Snake Valley and must last at least five
203years.
As part of the Agreement and the EMMA, Nevada would agree to participate
with Utah in the Conservation Agreement and Strategy for the Columbia spotted
frog and the Conservation Agreement and Strategy for the least chub.204
198 RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 127, at 12.
199 EMMA, supra note 195, at §§ 2.3, 5.1.200 d. § 5.1.1.
201 Id. § 5.2.
202 id
2031 d. §§ 2.2, 5.3.
204 Final Proposed Agreement, supra note 10, at § 7.1; EMMA, supra note 195, at
§ 5.2; see BAILEY ET AL., UTAH Div. OF WILDLIFE RES., CONSERVATION AGREEMENT AND
STRATEGY FOR THE COLUMBIA SPOTTED FROG (RANA LUTEIVENTRIS) IN THE STATE OF UTAH
3 (1998), available at http://waterrights.utah.gov/snakeValleyAgreement/spotted frog.pdf
(recognizing that all signatories to the agreement have a responsibility to help the recovery
efforts of the Columbia spotted frog); BAILEY ET AL., UTAH Div. OF WILDLIFE RES.,
CONSERVATION AGREEMENT AND STRATEGY FOR THE LEAST CHUB (IOTICHTHYS
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Importantly, the Columbia spotted frog and least chub are not the only species that
the Agreement would protect since the agreement "is a vehicle to draft a Biological
Monitoring Plan," rather than the Plan itself.2 05 The Agreement's drafters
envisaged the inclusion of "additional species, habitats, and areas" for
identification and monitoring as part of the Plan through Conservation Action
Planning process of The Nature Conservancy.206 Moreover, before groundwater
development operations began, the states would have detailed in their Management
Response and Operation Plan a definition of "potential adverse impacts" to
environmental resources and lay out "early warning indicators" and "management
response actions to avoid impacts."20 7 In addition to the biological and hydrologic
monitoring laid out in the interstate plan for the Snake Valley, Nevada would
continue to carry out its own biological and hydrologic monitoring activities within
Nevada, including through its Spring Valley Monitoring Plan, which covers the
"the resources most likely to be impacted in the South Snake Valley." 208
The Agreement also addressed the concerns about impacts to air quality in the
area from SNWA groundwater pumping, particularly along the Wasatch Front.20
While worries about air quality featured prominently in opposition to the
Agreement, "[w]ithout the Agreement, each State's ability to responsibly deal with
potential effects from any future groundwater withdrawals in Snake Valley is
significantly reduced." 2 10 Indeed, the Agreement provided for the development of
one of the most extensive air-quality and public-health monitoring regimes ever
implemented in conjunction with a groundwater project. The EMMA would have
mandated that air quality and coincident meteorological parameters "be sampled
and reported continuously on an hourly average basis" and "submitted hourly to
Utah Division of Air Quality (UDAQ)." 2 1 1 Reports would be prepared that
included summary tables and charts of "air quality data comparable to the
NAAQS, maximum data, mean data, data quality and completeness, and other
information deemed important by the TWG."2 12
PHLEGETHONTIS) IN THE STATE OF UTAH 2-3 (2005), available at http://wildlife.utah.gov/
pdf/LCCAS 30NOV05.pdf (stating that the State agencies with implemented cooperative
agreements are responsible for the conservation and enhancement of the least chub and the
ecosystems upon which they depend).
205 RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 127, at 15.
206 [d
207 d
208 Id., see, e.g., BIOLOGICAL WORK GROUP, BIOLOGICAL MONITORING PLAN FOR THE
SPRING VALLEY STIPULATION (2009), available at http://www.fws.gov/nevada/highlights/
comment/springvalley/Biological Monitoring Plan SpringValley StipulationFeb 09.p
df (describing an exhaustive biological monitoring plan for the Spring Valley).
209 RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 127, at 6-7.210 Id at7.
211 EMMA, supra note 195, at § 7.3.
2 12 id.
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Because the EMMA would have provided for SNWA to install and operate an
air monitoring station in Utah within one year of the Agreement's signing, Utah
would have "at least nine years of baseline data before any withdrawals might
begin." 2 13 As both states' negotiating teams pointed out in their responses to public
comments on the draft agreement, the collection and public reporting of both
baseline and post-development data points on particulate matter, precipitation, and
other metrics would allow Utah, or Utah residents, in the event of any
"unacceptable air quality deterioration," to "assert and prove" an adverse impact
by pointing to any increase in air pollutants or particulate matter (evaluated under
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)) or declines in visibility
(evaluated under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration standards). 2 14 As on
other aspects of the Agreement, the Agreement's air-pollution provisions were
cautious, prudent, and data driven; it is clear that "the health of Utah's citizens"-
and Nevada's citizens-would have been "better protected with this Agreement
than without it." 215
The Agreement envisaged the ongoing use of future "scientifically reliable
reports, studies, [and] data collection efforts" as "valuable tools in further refining
the Available Groundwater Supply of Snake Valley," and under the Agreement the
states would have used such studies, along with actual monitoring data, to revise
groundwater estimates. 216 The Agreement would have mandated that "[a]ll data
used or proposed to be used to revise estimates" and all "monitoring data" would
be "shared between the States and . . . made available to the public on a periodic
basis."2 17 Both States would have committed to cooperation of data gathering, data
sharing, and incorporation of monitoring data into a database.218
The extensive monitoring and analysis mandated by the Agreement would
have provided a data-rich scientific backdrop upon which the state engineers; state
water managers, and the entities created by the Agreement could tweak
groundwater development to avoid any adverse impacts. Moreover, the data would
213 RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 127, at 7.214 id.
215 d
216 Final Proposed Agreement, supra note 10, at § 3.4. See also John Ruple, Clear
Law and Murky Facts: Utah's Approach to Conjunctive Surface and Groundwater
Management, 47 IDAHO L. REv. 217, 253-54 (2011) ("All those with an interest in
conjunctive water resource management must seek solutions based on sound science that
incorporates flexibility to respond to new information and changed conditions. As Utah's
chief water planner pointed out, conjunctive management really means adaptive
management, and our efforts must begin with a clearer vision of what we are managing
for.").
217 Final Proposed Agreement, supra note 10, at §§ 3.4, 4.4. Presumably such
disclosure would have been governed under the public-records law of Utah and Nevada.
See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63G-2-101 to 108 (LexisNexis 2011 & Supp. 2012); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 239.001-.330 (LexisNexis 2012).
218 Final Proposed Agreement, supra note 10, at § 4.4.
1584 [No. 6
INTERSTATE GROUNDWATER LAW
also be available so that private parties and local governments could ensure that
actions taken as part of the development of Snake Valley groundwater comply with
federal environmental statutes, including the Endangered Species Act219 and
potentially the Clean Water Act.220 Contrary to the statements of opponents of the
Agreement, the Snake Valley groundwater management scheme created by the
Agreement would have implemented a careful and orderly plan for the
development of groundwater while ensuring protection of natural resources.
While "interstate compacts are time consuming to negotiate and adopt," the
existence of interstate agreements addressing issues likely to arise repeatedly, such
as transboundary groundwater reserves, means that states "do not have to start
from scratch."22 1 While interstate agreements will, of course, vary according to
local conditions, ideally being flexible and adaptive in character, such agreements
serve as important baseline models, especially on novel issues, because they show
that cooperative interstate management is possible, demonstrate a framework
222
within which states can work, and show how agreements work in practice.
219 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006)). If a plaintiff believed that groundwater pumping was
resulting in habitat loss in the basin, adversely impacting ESA-protected species, an action
could be brought under the ESA. See Sierra Club v. Lujan, No. MO-91-CA-069, 1993 WL
151353, at *21 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 1993) (enjoining groundwater pumping of the Edwards
Basin on ESA grounds), vacated sub nom. Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio, 112 F.3d
789 (5th Cir. 1997) (vacating injunction on Burford abstention grounds because
subsequently enacted Texas legislation had created comprehensive regulatory scheme for
Edwards Aquifer), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1089 (1998).
220 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 816 (1972)
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006)). It is unclear whether the CWA
applies to groundwater. Baxtresser, supra note 6 at 788 n.69 (noting that "most courts have
ruled that the Clean Water Act does not apply to groundwater"); see also James W.
Hayman, Regulating Point-Source Discharges to Groundwater Hydrologically Connected
to Navigable Waters: An Unresolved Question of Environmental Protection Agency
Authority Under the Clean Water Act, 5 BARRY L. REv. 95 (2005); Jason R. Jones,
Comment, The Clean Water Act: Groundwater Regulation and the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System, 8 DICK. J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 93 (1999); Anna Makowski,
Beneath the Surface of the Clean Water Act: Exploring the Depth of the Act's
Jurisdictional Scope of Groundwater Pollution, 91 OR. L. REv. 495 (2012). But if the
CWA does apply to groundwater, the extensive data collected certainly would assist in
asserting a CWA claim.
221 Stephanie Showalter et al., Converting the Erie Pier Confined Disposal Facility to
a Processing and Reuse Facility: Is an Interstate Compact a Necessary Component?, 41 J.
MAR. L. & CoM. 197, 234 (2010).
222 See Hall, supra note 2, at 288-90, 321 (discussing the Delaware River Basin
Compact, Susquehanna River Basin Compact, and Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin
Water, Resources Compact "modem models of interstate water compacts that include
adaptive tools" for "adapting to the risks and uncertainties of climate change"); see also
Joseph W. Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles Over Rivers: The Southeastern States and the
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Because the proposed Snake Valley Agreement was carefully drafted, equitable to
both states, and environmentally and pragmatically wise, it should serve as a model
for future transboundary aquifer disputes.
C. Potential Unrealized: The Misguided Opposition to the Agreement
As alluded to above, the Agreement was met with much opposition in Utah,
leading directly to Governor Herbert's decision not to sign it. 223 In March 2013, for
example, twenty-seven Utah groups sent a letter urging the governor to reject the
Agreement.224
Two major themes emerged across the spectrum of Utahn resistance to the
Agreement. The first was dire warnings of catastrophic consequences if the
Agreement was signed. Opponents warned that the Agreement was an "evil
project" 225 that would "lower water tables, threaten spring ecosystems, impact
sensitive species, reduce fishing/hunting opportunities, promote dust storms," and
possibly cause "[w]idespread desertification," 2 2 6 all of which would disrupt -the
hydrology of the Snake Valley and put its wetlands and ranches into a "death
spiral." 227
The second theme, related to the first, was fiery rhetoric that cast the
Agreement as a "Nevada water grab," with nefarious Nevadans plotting to "steal"
water that rightfully belonged to Utah.22 8 This characterization was pervasive,2 29
Struggle Over The 'Hooch, 12 N.Y.U ENVT'L L.J. 828, 386 (2005) (discussing how
interstate water agreements fall into three general "patterns").
223 See supra text accompanying notes 104-108.
224 Brian Maffly, Nevada Water Deal a Raw Deal for Utah, Groups Tell Herbert,
SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 11, 2012, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/55438688-78/accord
ing-agreement-environmental-herbert.html.csp; Richard Piatt, Battle Over Utah-Nevada
Water Rights in Snake Valley Continues, KSL.COM, Mar. 29, 2013, http://www.ksl.com
/?nid=148&sid=24590610/.
225 Brian Maffly, Governor Discusses Water Battle in Snake Valley, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Mar. 21, 2013, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/56036851-78/valley-herbert-utah-
agreement.html.csp (statement of an opponent of the Agreement who attended a public
meeting).
226 Opportunity to Comment on the DEIS for SNWA's Snake Valley Pipeline, FRIENDS
OF GREAT SALT LAKE, http://www.fogsl.org/advocacy/current-issues/257-opportunity-to-
comment-on-the-deis-for-snwas-snake-valley-pipeline (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
227 Brandon Loomis, Goshutes Fear Losing Their Sacred Water-to Vegas, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Apr. 25, 2011, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/51665514-90/spring-
goshutes-nevada-valley.html.csp; Smart et al., supra note 105.
228 See Angelyn N. Hutchinson, Water Wars: Snake Valley Issue is Not as Simple as
David vs. Goliath, DESERET NEWS, Nov. 8, 2009, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/705
342944/Water-wars-Snake-Valley-issue-is-not-as-simple-as-David-vs-Goliath.html ("It's
easy to paint caricatures, putting the pugilists into their respective comers of the ring. On
one side are the greedy Nevada would-be water purveyors who want to slip into Utah's
already parched west desert and use big bucks and slick lawyers to steal precious water
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almost memetic,230 and typical of the "overzealous" and "colorful political rhetoric
generated by questions of interstate water allocation." 23' Typical of the public
discourse was an op-ed jointly written by an Indian tribal official, a Snake Valley
business owner, and an environmental activist under the title "10 Reasons Not to
Give Utah Water to Nevada."232 Even Governor Herbert invoked this rhetorical
sleight-of-hand in the lead-up to his decision to reject the agreement, making
statements such as "[m]y goal is very clear. No. 1, we will not give up one
molecule of water to Nevada that is Utah water." 23 3
Water consumers, with the most direct stake in any potential outcome, were
the source of some of the most vocal objections. Ranchers, farmers, and miners
were the central force in this group, crowding public hearings to express anger and
disappointment at what they viewed as a "sellout" agreement.234 The Utah Farm
Bureau, the state's farmer and rancher lobby, went on record in opposition to the
from the aquifer. If they get it, as one Snake Valley rancher said, they will squander it on
'gluttony, glitter, girls and gambling."'); Ted Wilson, Letter to the Editor, Water Grab
Stakes, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 29, 2013, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/opinion/56067998-
82/nevada-utah-program-agreement.html.csp.
229 See, e.g., Robert Gehrke, Utah's Rejection of Water Deal Leaves Nevada With
Few Good Options, SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 4, 2013, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics
/56108808-90/nevada-utah-agreement-snake.html.csp; Daniel McCool, A Coalition to Stop
Water Grab, SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 2, 2013, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/opinion/5608994
6-82/pipeline-utah-basin-stop.html.csp.
230 A meme is a unit of culturally transmitted information, susceptible to replication
and spread by social imitation. See Neal A. Gordon, Note, The Implications of Memetics
for the Cultural Defense, 50 DUKE L.J. 1809, 1816-19 (2001). Of course, "[tJhe most
widespread memes are not necessarily the most beneficial memes; they are simply the
memes that are best at spreading." Id. at 1820. Unhelpful or false memes appear frequently
in journalism and political discourse. See, e.g., Dan Kahan, The False and Tedious
"Defective Brain " Meme, CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT, YALE LAW SCH. (Feb. 22,
2013, 7:54 AM), http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2013/2/22/the-false-and-tedious- de
fective-brain-meme.html.
231 Douglas L. Grant, The Future of Interstate Allocation of Water, 29 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 977, 977 (1983).
232 Ruppert Steele et al., 10 Reasons Not to Give Utah Water to Nevada, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Jan. 15, 2010, http://archive.sltrib.com/printfriendly.php?id=14201199&itype=ngps
id.
233 Paul Foy, Utah Governor Agonizing Over Nevada's Water Play, Bus. WK. (Mar.
29, 2013) http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2013-03-29/utah-govemor-agonizing-over-nev
adas-water-play (statement of Gov. Herbert on March 28, 2012).
234 Brandon Loomis, Snake Valley Ranchers Riled by 'Sellout' Water Deal, SALT
LAKE TRIBi., Aug. 17, 2009, http://www.sltrib.com/news/ci 13148334; Brian Maffly,
Water A Life-and-Death Issue for Snake Valley, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 28, 2013,
http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/56047882-78/agreement-utah-valley-snake.html.csp; Peg
McEntee, Column, Herbert's 'My Hero'-Snake Valley Rancher Says It All, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Apr. 3, 2013, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/56101939-90/valley-snake-herber
t-garland.html.csp.
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Agreement.235 Utah's Indian tribes were also strongly opposed to the Agreement.
Leaders of the 566-member Confederate Band of Goshute Indians, whose
reservation is located in the Snake Valley, claimed that the Agreement was a
"massive and reckless project" that would "steal our water," "decimate our
people," and "destroy the livelihoods of . .. tribal communities."236 The Goshute
even established a special website to oppose the Agreement.23 7 Utah's tribal
leaders passed a joint intertribal resolution at their annual meeting demanding that
the governor reject the Agreement. 2 3 8 Another large Utah water consumer, The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints--one of the most powerful political
and economic forces in Utah 239-also opposed the Agreement. 24 0 This was not the
first time the LDS Church publicly weighed in on the Utah-Nevada water
dispute; 24 1 as it has historically, the Church continues to have influence on Western
water law.
242
235 See Christopher Smart, Critics Warn of Dangers From Nevada Water Pipeline
Plan, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 12, 2011, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/52373517-78/ne
vada-utah-aquifers-blm.html.csp; E-mail from Randy Parker, Chief Exec: Officer, Utah
Farm Bureau Fed'n, to Michael Styler, Exec. Dir., Utah Dep't of Natural Res. (Sept. 30,
2009, 12:46 PM), available at http://waterrights.utah.gov/snakeValleyAgreement/com
ments/c162.txt (designated Comment No. 162).
236 Associated Press, Goshutes Blast BLM Study on Las Vegas Water Pipeline, Aug.
5, 2012, http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/nevada-and-west/goshutes-blast-blm-study-la
s-vegas-water-pipeline/; Goshute Tribes Fight for Water Rights in Face of 300-Mile
Pipeline to Vegas, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Aug. 20, 2012, http://indiancountrytodaymedi
anetwork.com/article/Goshute-tribes-fight-for-water-rights-in-face-of-300-mile-pipeline-to
-vegas-130218 (quoting the chairman of the Confederate Tribes of the Goshute Indian
Reservation and the tribe's website); Brandon Loomis, Goshutes Fear Losing Their Sacred
Water-to Vegas, SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 25, 2011, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/51
665514-90/spring-goshutes-nevada-valley.html.csp; Smart et al., supra note 105.
237 Protect Goshute Water, CONFEDERATE TRIBES OF THE GOSHUTE RESERVATION,
http://www.goshutewater.org/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
238 Joint Inter-Tribal Resolution #UTLAUG-06- 11, Opposing the Signing of the Utah-
Nevada Agreement on the Snake Valley Groundwater Management System (Aug. 11,
2011), available at http://greatbasinwater.net/pubs/TribaLeadersOpposeWaterGrabbyNeva
da.pdf.
239 JOHN BURGHARDT WRIGHT, ROCKY MOUNTAIN DIVIDE: SELLING AND SAVING THE
WEST 139 (1993).
240 Smart et al., supra note 105.
241 Amy Joi O'Donoghue, Mormon Church Among Protesters of Las Vegas Water
Plan, DESERET NEWS, June 9, 2010, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700038615/Mor
mon-church-among-protesters-of-Las-Vegas-water-plan.html.
242 Brigham Daniels, Revitalizing Zion: Nineteenth-Century Mormonism and Today's
Urban Sprawl, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 257, 271 n.82 (2008) ("Mormons did
much to change the face of natural resources law, particularly water law."); A. Dan Tarlock
& Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Growth Management and Western Water Law: From Urban
Oases to Archipelagos, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 983, 1001 (2008)
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Utah media and political leadership also organized against the deal. Officials
in Salt Lake, 24 3 Juab, 244 Millard,2 4 5 Utah, Beaver, and Tooele counties mobilized
together with the Utah Association of Counties to urge the governor not to sign the
246Agreement. Salt Lake County Mayor Peter Corroon, the leader of the state's
most populous county, personally urged the governor to reject the Agreement.24 7
Members of the Utah Legislature were also either skeptical of or opposed to the
248 Sat249Agreement. The Salt Lake Tribune consistently editorialized against the plan,
as did other Utah editorial boards and columnists. 25 0 Utah Democrats-while not a
particularly powerful force in deep-red Utah 25 1-also opposed the Agreement.2 52
("Water law's communitarian, utilitarian strain, derived from the Mormon experience in
pre-statehood Utah, required water to be put to an immediate productive use.").
243 Letter from Peter M. Corroon, Mayor, Salt Lake Cnty. & Joe Hatch, Salt Lake
Cnty. Council Chair, to Michael R. Styler, Exec. Dir., Utah Dep't of Natural Res. (Sept. 29,
2009), available at http://waterrights.utah.gov/snakeValleyAgreement/comments/c104.pdf
(designated as Comment No. 104).
244 Letter from Val W. Jones, Chairman, Juab Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs (Sept. 29,
2009), available at http://waterrights.utah.gov/snakeValleyAgreement/comments/cl07.pdf
(designated as Comment No. 107).
245 Statement of Reasons for Millard County's Opposition to the August 13, 2009
Proposed Agreement Between Utah and Nevada (Aug. 14, 2009), available at http://waterri
ghts.utah.gov/snakeValleyAgreement/comments/c003.doc (designated as Comment No. 3).
246 Brandon Loomis, Counties Fear Utah Selling Out Snake Valley Water, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Aug. 2, 2009, http://www.sltrib.com/news/ci_12968010; Amy Joi O'Donoghue,
Snake Valley Water Split Angers Utahns, DESERET NEWS, Sept. 9, 2009, http://www.desere
tnews.com/article/705328741/Snake-Valley-water-split-angers-Utahns.html; Amy Joi
O'Donoghue, Utah Counties Renew Objections to Snake Valley Water Plan, DESERET
NEWS, Oct. 30, 2012, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865565627/Utah-counties-renew
-objections-to-Snake-Valley-water-plan.html; Christopher Smart, Millard County: Snake
Valley Deal 'Forfeits' Utah Water, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 31, 2012, http://www.sltrib.com
/sltrib/news/55184343-78/utah-groundwater-agreement-county.html.csp.
247 Charlotte Duren, Mayor Corroon Urges Governor to Oppose Snake Valley
Agreement, KCPW (Oct. 31, 2012), http://kcpw.org/blog/local-news/2012-10-31/mayor-co
rroon-urges-governor-to-oppose-snake-valley-agreement; News Release, Mayor Corroon
Supports Millard County Opposing Proposed Snake Valley Agreement (Oct. 31, 2012),
available at http://news.slco.org/2012/elected/20121031.html.
248 Patty Henetz, Utah Lawmakers Not Sold on Snake Valley Water Deal, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Aug. 19, 2009, http://www.sltrib.com/news/ci_13162981.
249 E.g., Don't Sign, Governor, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 9, 2010, http://www.sltrib.com/
opinion/ci 14151786/; Say No to Las Vegas, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 27, 2013, http://www.
sltrib.com/sltrib/opinion/56063378-82/valley-agreement-snake-utah.html.csp; Snake Valley
Water, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 1, 2012, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/opinion/55178585-82/
utah-valley-nevada-snake.html.csp.
25o E.g., Peg McEntee, Utah's Snake Valley Water Is Worth Fighting For, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Dec. 5, 2012, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/55335832-90/snake-valley-sltrib-
utah.html.csp; Water Project Could Wreck Ecology of the Snake Valley, THE PARK
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A number of Utah environmental groups expressed opposition to the
Agreement, including the Utah Rivers Council, 25 3 Great Basin Water Network, 254
Friends of the Great Salt Lake,2 55 Citizens for Dixie's Future,25 6 and Utah
Physicians for a Healthy Environment. 257 Environmentalists claimed that the
Agreement "would have been a tragedy for the West Desert, creating an impact on
a land area the size of Vermont and a dust bowl that would create dust problems
across the entire Intermountain West." 2 58 The Utah Medical Association (UMA),
the largest physicians' group in the state, opposed the agreement, claiming the
Agreement would "expose the public to carcinogens, radiation and valley fever
[coccidioidomycosis] and jeopardize Utahns' very lives." 25 9 The UMA and others
who claimed that the Agreement would cause an "airpocalypse" put forth almost
RECORD, Mar. 29, 2013, http://www.parkrecord.com/ci_22902525/water-project-could-wre
ck-ecology-snake-valley.
251 Utah may be the most Republican state in the Union. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Jones,
D.C., Hawaii Most Democratic, Utah Most Republican State in 'll, GALLUP (Aug. 11,
2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/148949/hawaii-democratic-utah-republican-state.aspx.
But see, e.g., Micah Cohen, Utah: Very Republican, but Not Quite as Conservative as It
Appears, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2012, http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/09/
utah-very-republican-but-not-as-conservative-as-it-appears/.
252 Wayne Holland, Snake Valley: Secret Talks, Quick Deals and a Sucker's Bet,
STANDARD-EXAMINER, Oct. 3, 2009, http://www.standard.net/topics/opinion/2009/10/03/
snake-valley-secret-talks-quick-deals-and-sucker39s-bet (including an op-ed of Utah
Democratic Party chair attacking agreement); Smart et al., supra note 105.
253 Piatt, supra note 224.
254 Letter from Susan Lynn et al. to Allen Biaggi, Dir., Nev. Dep't of Conservation &
Natural Res. & Mike Styler, Dir., Utah Dep't of Natural Res. (Sept. 23, 2009), available at
http://waterrights.utah.gov/snakeValleyAgreement/comments/m025.pdf (designated as
Comment No. 25); Utahns Protest Snake Valley Water Pact with Nevada, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Mar. 28, 2013, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/56073626-78/valley-snake-agreem
ent-nevada.html.csp (reporting a statement of Steve Erickson, a member of the board of
directors of the Great Basin Water Network).
255 Amy Joi O'Donoghue, Groups Urge Herbert to Hold Off on Snake Valley Water
Agreement, DESERET NEWS, Mar. 27, 2013, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/86557682
3/Groups-urge-Herbert-to-hold-off-on-Snake-Valley-water-agreement.html.
256 d
257 E-mail from Brian Moench, President of Utah Physicians for a Healthy
Environment, to Utah Dep't of Natural Res. (Sept. 30, 2009, 12:07 AM), available at http:/
/waterrights. utah.gov/snakeValleyAgreement/comments/cl38.txt (designated as Comment
No. 138); Brian Moench, My View: Say No to Water Pipeline Agreement, DESERET NEWS,
Mar. 27, 2013, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865576746/Say-no-to-Water-Pipeline-
agreement.html; see McEntee, supra note 234.
258 Matt Jensen, Governor Will Not Sign Snake Valley Water Deal, UTAH PUB. RADIO
(Apr. 3, 2013, 4:31 PM), http://www.utahpublicradio.org/post/governor-will-not-sign-snak
e-valley-water-deal (quoting Zach Frankel, founding director of the Utah Rivers Council).
259 Patty Henetz, Snake Valley Water Deal Could Kill Utahans, Docs Warn, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Sept. 30, 2009, http://www.sltrib.com/News/ci 13453299.
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zero evidence that the project would actually increase dust storms and air
pollution. 260 Rather, the putative public-health concerns were largely based on
speculation (including claims that the Agreement would cause Great Basin aquifers
to "disappear, creating a junior Sahara Desert") and based on irrelevant
comparisons (such as comparisons to the Aral Sea in Uzbekistan or the Owens
Valley in California, neither of which had a monitoring and environmental
protection agreement like the one proposed for Snake Valley) and the summary
dismissal of the value of the Agreement's built-in monitoring and safe-yield
measures, 261 which in fact would be extensive and cautious, 26 2 or the ten-year
study period that the Agreement would have mandated before a drop of
groundwater could be withdrawn.263
Although support and opposition for the Agreement was fairly polarized
across state lines, this pattern was not universal. For example, ranchers in rural
White Pine County, Nevada, located in the Snake Valley, joined forces with their
264Utah counterparts to strongly oppose the Agreement.
Conversely, a number of Utahns expressed support for the Agreement,
arguing that the Agreement was equitable and provided useful measures for
environmental protection. Supporters pointed out that Utah would fare worse if its
refusal to sign the Agreement prompted protracted equitable-apportionment
litigation, which could result in a court order with terms far less favorable for Utah
and the environment. This was the conclusion of the review of the Agreement
commissioned by Governor Herbert and conducted by water attorneys Steven E.
Clyde, Dallin W. Jensen, and Warren H. Peterson-nicknamed the three water
"wise men"265 released in October 2012.266 Utah Department of Natural
260 Brian Moench, Water Pact an Ecological Disaster, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 23,
2013, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/opinion/56046241-82/dust-utah-valley-storms.html.csp.
261 Id. (asserting, with no evidence, that "[b]y the time monitoring detects vegetation
die-off, the consequences will already have become irreversible.").
262 See supra Part II.B.3.
263 See supra text accompanying notes 173-175.
264 Emily Green, Quenching Las Vegas' Thirst: Part 4: Not This Water, LAS VEGAS
SUN, June 22, 2008, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2008/jun/22/not-water/; see also
George Knapp, Rural Residents Battle Southern Nevada Water Grab, KLAS-TV (Sept. 22,
2006, 5:50 PM), http://www.8newsnow.com/story/5442943/rural-residents-battle-southern-
nevada-water-grab; Longson, supra note 21, at 50 ("The 'Utah side' of the argument ...
can be more accurately termed the 'rural side' of the argument."); Loomis, supra note 227.
265 Judy Fahys, Utah Board Wants Herbert to Reconsider Snake Valley Water Deal
Rejection, SALT LAKE TRIB., May 15, 2013, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/56311015-
78/utah-herbert-agreement-nevada.html.csp; Paul Foy, Nev. Water Official Says Utah in a
Bad Place Rejecting Agreement, STANDARD-EXAM INER, May 15, 2013, http://www.standar
d.net/stories/2013/05/15/nev-water-official-says-utah-bad-place-rejecting-agreement.
266 Amy Joi O'Donoghue, Report: Snake Valley Water Agreement Better Than
Lawsuits, DESERET NEWS, Oct. 29, 2012, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865565574/
Report-Snake-Valley-water-agreement-better-than-lawsuits.html; Christopher Smart, Task
Force Says Snake Valley Water Deal 'Equitable' for Utah, SALT LAKE TRLB., Oct. 30,
15912013]
UTAH LAW REVIEW
Resources executive director Michael R. Styler offered similar warnings.267 The
chair of the Utah Republican Party268 and at least two Utah media outlets also
editorialized in favor of the Snake Valley Agreement, stating that an imperfect
agreement would have been far better for Utah than no agreement at all. 2 69
Much of the opposition to the Agreement was based on myth and ignores both
legal and hydrological realities. Speculation about environmental damage was
largely unsupported by the studies that have been conducted, while the Agreement
includes extensive protections for current water users and provisions for water
conservation. Most scientifically and legally unfounded were the notions of "Utah
water" and a "Nevada water grab." As the Utah Division of Water Resources'
Snake Valley Agreement Benefits Memo acknowledges: "Some have argued that
any water [SNWA] takes 'steals' Utah's water. This is incorrect, since Nevada is
legally entitled to an equitable portion of the Snake Valley water." 2 7 0 Indeed, a fact
almost never brought up by opponents of the Agreement is that while
"approximately 70% of the Snake Valley aquifer lies in Utah, . . . 60% of its
recharge comes from snowpack in the Snake Range Mountains on the Nevada side
2012, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/55172176-78/agreement-utah-nevada-groundwater
.html.csp.
267 E.g., Maffly, supra note 225 (reporting Styler's statement that the Agreement
"contains substantial protection measures that would be lost" if not signed); see also Patty
Henetz, Did Utah Blink in Snake Valley Talks?, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 19, 2009, http://ww
w.sltrib.com/news/ci 13596248.
268 Dave Hansen, The Truth About the Snake Valley Agreement, STANDARD-
EXAMINER, Oct. 24, 2009, http://www.standard.net/topics/opinion/2009/10/24/truth-about-
snake-valley-agreement. In an op-ed, the Utah Republican Party chairman stated that,
"[w]ithout an agreement, the Southern Nevada Water Authority has the ability to simply
dig a pipeline and take water, without concem to the environment, Utah or its water
users.... The worst gamble for Utah is to listen to those uninformed voices that believe
Snake Valley is better protected with no agreement." Id.
269 Con Psarras, Editorial, Snake Valley Water, KSL-TV (Aug. 21, 2009), http://www.
ksl.com/?nid=238&sid=7611343 ("As much as its vocal opponents disdain it, the recently
negotiated draft agreement between Utah and Nevada over water rights in Snake Valley
provides a reasonable, proactive approach to addressing a very complex issue. . . . [T]he
agreement's basic framework is solid and warrants support."); Pumping Desert Water,
DESERET NEWS, Dec. 18, 2012, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/76561807 1/Pumping-
desert-water.html ("The best way to protect Utah's interests in this long struggle may be to
sign an agreement between the two states that at least offers important protections for
Utah.... [A]n agreement that provides for a clear mechanism to shut down pumps as soon
as any environmental degradation is determined is much better than having no agreement at
all.").
270 Memorandum from the Utah Div. of Water Rights, Benefits of a Utah/Nevada
Agreement on the Allocation and Management of the Snake Valley Aquifer 2 n. 1, available
at http://waterrights.utah.gov/snakeValleyAgreement/SnakeValley-BenefitMemo.pdf.
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of the border," 27 1 where the Snake Range's "north-south ridge . . . rises above
13,000 feet to comb rain and snow from the desert air." 2 7 2
As discussed previously, 2 73 the Agreement would have been a far better
approach to interstate groundwater management than protracted, adversarial
equitable-apportionment litigation. While negotiations among sovereigns are often
complex and difficult, 274 the advantages of a comprehensive, flexible cooperative
scheme for interstate water management are highly significant.2 75 Moreover, the
advantages of cooperative management, and the drawbacks of equitable
apportionment, are particularly pronounced in the context of groundwater because
(a) if states choose to do nothing, the result will be a free-for-all that leads to
groundwater depletion; (b) equitable apportionment outcomes are uncertain and
unreliable; and (c) groundwater presents a host of complex issues specific to each
271 THREE PARAMETERS PLUS, INC. & COSHOW ENVTL., INC., BASELINE PHYSICAL
HABITAT CONDITIONS OF WETLANDS IN SOUTHERN SNAKE VALLEY, UTAH: FINAL REPORT
1 (2010), available at http://ugspub.nr.utah.gov/publications/Wildlife/Snake ValleyWet
lands/Volumel-122010.pdf (report for the Utah Division of Natural Resources, citing
BARCASS); see also Patricia Mulroy, Beyond the Divisions: A Compact That Unites, 28 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 105, 114 (2008) ("The headwaters of the groundwater
system in Snake Valley are firmly located within the state of Nevada. While most of the
groundwater recharge (roughly 60 percent) is generated in Nevada, most of the land use
occurs in Utah."); Smart et al., supra note 105.
272 Brean, supra note 3 1.
273 See supra Part 1l.
274 Carlton James Gausman, Comment, The Interstate Compact as a Solution to
Regional Problems: The Kansas City Metropolitan Culture District, 45 U. KAN. L. REV.
897, 906 (1997) (noting that "[t]he most notable problem" of interstate compacts is the
"difficulty of achieving agreement among the legislatures of different jurisdictions," which
makes negotiations "'a slow and cumbersome process at best,"' and that the average length
of time to create compacts dealing "with river management and control" is 8.75 years). See
also Gavin Clarkson & Jim Sebenius, Leveraging Tribal Sovereignty for Economic
Opportunity: A Strategic Negotiations Perspective, 76 Mo. L. REv. 1045, 1085 (2011)
("When approaching a negotiation, the parties must address its relevant context. A non-
exclusive list of contextual factors includes economic, competitive, historical, political,
institutional, and organizational matters.").
275 Gausman, supra note 274, at 906-07 ("Time delays ... should not be 'a fatal
handicap to the compact,' as the benefits outweigh the harms of political delay."); Justin
Newell Hesser, Comment, The Nature of Interstate Groundwater Resources and the Need
for States to Effectively Manage the Resource Through Interstate Compacts, 11 WYo. L.
REV. 25, 41-43 (2011) (arguing that "the best solution" for interstate groundwater disputes
is an interstate compact that controls groundwater depletion, dispels uncertainty, and
addresses the unique issues of each aquifer); Alyssa S. Lathrop, Comment, A Tale of Three
States: Equitable Apportionment of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin, 36
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 865, 879, 899-901 (2009) (noting that "cooperative," "forward-
looking," and "flexible" joint basin management regimes are far preferable to "extended
litigation" as method of resolving Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint river basin conflict
among Florida, Georgia, and Alabama).
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aquifer.276 These considerations explain why interstate agreements are "the
mechanism of 'judicial and congressional preference' in resolving interstate water
disputes," in preference to adjudication or congressional apportionment,2 77 and
what motivated Congress to its 2004 directive to Utah and Nevada in the first
place.
In a presentation delivered in March 2003, before the proverbial lines for the
dispute had been drawn, Deputy Utah State Engineer Boyd Clayton explained that
the states had a choice: "cooperative Nevada/Utah aquifer management with
common goals and built-in environmental protection," or "individual state aquifer
management agendas destined to inevitable discord." 2 7 8 After years of painstaking
negotiation, concessions, and studies to advance the first option, Utah ultimately
chose the latter course.
The door to the Snake Valley Agreement is slammed shut, but it is not yet
locked. Almost immediately after Governor Herbert announced that he would not
sign the Agreement, several influential Utahns urged him to reconsider.
The most notable push for reconsideration came from the Utah's Joint
Gubernatorial and Legislative State Water Development Commission, a statutorily
created body charged with determining "the state's role in the protection,
conservation, and development of the state's water resources." 279 The twenty-nine
member bipartisan Commission is composed of thirteen voting members and
sixteen nonvoting members. 2 80 The voting members are five state senators,
appointed by the Senate president, and eight state representatives, appointed by the
speaker of the state House. 2 8 1 The statute mandates balance on the Commission: no
more than four of the Senate appointees and six of the House appointees may be
from the same political party, and the Senate president and House speaker are
directed by statute to appoint members, "to the extent possible," who "represent
both rural and urban areas of the state."282 The sixteen nonvoting members include
representatives from each of the ten water districts in Utah, the executive directors
of the State Department of Natural Resources and the Department of
Environmental Quality, one representative each from the "organized
276 Hesser, supra note 275, at 41-43.
277 See E. Leif Reid, Note, Ripples From the Truckee: The Case for Congressional
Apportionment of Disputed Interstate Water Rights, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 158-62
(1995); see also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564 (1963) ("In exercising [original]
jurisdiction [of interstate disputes], we are mindful of this Court's often expressed
preference that, where possible, States settle their controversies by 'mutual accommodation
and agreement."').
278 Boyd Clayton, Utah/Nevada Ground- Water Agreement, Utah Div. of Water Rights
(Mar. 19, 2013) (Powerpoint presentation available at http://www.waterrights.utah.gov
/meetinfo/m20130318_wuw/20130319-bclayton-WUW.ppt).
279 UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-27-102(1) (West 2004).280 Id. § 102(2).
281 Id. § 102(2)(a)-(b).
282 Id. § 102(2H3).
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environmental" and "agricultural production" communities, the State
Commissioner of Agriculture and Food, a member of the State Board of Water
Resources, and an appointee of the Governor.2 83
On May 14, a little after two months after Governor Herbert announced that
he would not sign the Agreement, the Commission weighed in publicly, voting to
send the governor a letter "urging Herbert to reverse course and sign" an
agreement, which the Commission urged would best protect "Snake Valley water
rights and statewide interests."284 The letter warned that "[a]bsent an agreement,
Nevada could take action that would allow the transfer of Utah water to Nevada
without any Utah involvement or oversight" and that "[w]ithout [the] protections
provided in the agreement, negative environmental impacts could affect the entire
state, not just the Snake Valley area." 2 8 5 All but 'a single member of the
Commission voted to send the letter; the four representatives of Herbert's
administration (DEQ director Amanda Smith, DNR director Michael R. Styler, and
Deputy Chief of Staff Mike Mower) abstained.2 86 Among the leading members of
the Commission is Washington County Water Conservancy District General
Manager Ronald W. (Ron) Thompson, described as an influential figure in
28Western water circles.287 It was Thompson who articulated a number of the
Commission's concerns.
The Commission raised three concerns about Utah's decision to back down
from the Snake Valley Agreement, focusing on the merits of the Agreement, the
reputational costs of rejecting the Agreement, and the broader breakdown in
regional water management cooperation that a rejection would cause.
The Commission's first argument was simple: Utah is unlikely to get a better
deal than the Agreement offered. Thompson expressed a view that "the deal was
283 Id § 102(2)(c).
284 Fahys, supra note 265; see also Amy Joi O'Donoghue, Group of Utah Legislators
Wants Herbert to Reconsider Snake Valley Decision, DESERET NEWS, May 14, 2013, http://
www.deseretnews.com/article/865580042/Group-of-Utah-legislators-wants-Herbert-to-rec
onsider-Snake-Valley-decision.html; Brian Maffly, Rejecting Nevada Water Deal Hurts
Utah, Critics Say, SALT LAKE TRrB., May 25, 2013, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/563
37675-78/utah-nevada-agreement-valley.html.csp.
285 Brian Maffly, Herbert Not Budging on Snake Valley Deal, SALT LAKE TRIB., June
18, 2013 http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/56478014-78/utah-agreement-nevada-valley.ht
ml.csp.
286 Fahys, supra note 265.
287 Maffly, supra note 284. Thompson sits on the board of the National Water
Resources Association, see Board of Directors, NAT'L WATER RESOURCES Ass'N,
http://www.nwra.org/about/board-directors/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2014), and has testified on
water issues before Congress, see Research to Improve Water-Use Efficiency and
Conservation: Technologies and Practices: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Energy &
Env't of the H. Comm. on Sci., Space, and Tech. 14-17, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of
Ronald W. Thompson, General Manager, Washington County Water Conservancy
District).
288 Maffly, supra note 284.
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sensible and solid" and felt "mystified about the objections raised by" those who
had opposed the deal.28 9 "Ultimately they [the Nevadans] will figure out how to"
go through with the Snake Valley project, Thompson warned, and Utah will get no
more favorable terms than Nevada was offering in the proposed agreement, which
Thompson stressed was "a strong agreement in Utah's favor."2 90 Utah Senator
Scott K. Jenkins of Plain City, a Republican and Commission member, stated that
the decision not to sign the Agreement was "a colossal mistake . . . ."291 Utah
Senator Margaret Dayton of Orem, also a Republican and Commission member,
expressed similar views.292 As we discuss infra, this concern is highly salient
because Nevada is likely to prevail in equitable-apportionment litigation.293
Warren H. Peterson, one of the three water "wise men" who wrote the study urging
Governor Herbert to sign the Agreement, gave a presentation to the Commission
before the vote, urging a "reset" of agreement consideration allowing the governor
to sign an "imperfect [but] good enough agreement." 294 Peterson criticized the
emotionalism that contributed to the political pressure on Governor Herbert to
reject the Agreement, telling the Commission that the media "distort[ed] the facts
about" the Agreement and stirred "up a frenzy of opposition,"295 and criticizing
"sound bite" rhetoric (such as "we can have crops or craps") as "entertaining" but
lacking in "probative value. ... 296
The second concern raised by the Commission was that the rejection of the
deal after years of negotiations exacted reputational costs of the state, risking "the
state's reputation for above-board dealing." 297 When a state backs down from an
agreement following exhaustive negotiations and signs of preliminary
commitment, some reputational loss is incurred, which affects how willing other
states will be to engage with the state in future. 298 Thompson stated that "the
289 Fahys, supra note 265.
290 Maffly, supra, note 284 (alteration in original) (quoting Thompson as stating: "It's
a false premise that if Utah doesn't come to an agreement, Nevada won't be able to
develop its water interest [in the Snake Valley].").
2 1 O'Donoghue, supra note 284.
292 Amy Joi O'Donoghue, Governor Herbert Says He Won't Change His Mind on
Snake Valley Water Sharing Agreement, DESERET NEWS, June 18, 2013, http://www.desere
tnews.com/article/865581863/Governor-Herbert-says-he-wont-change-his-mind-on-Snake-
Valley-water-sharing-agreement.htm (quoting Dayton as stating: "The pumping may be in
the future, but the time to address the concern is now . . .. I am disappointed that this is not
a position that is shared by the executive branch.").
293 See infra Part III.C.
294 Fahys, supra note 265 (alteration in original).
295 O'Donoghue, supra note 284.
296 Fahys, supra note 265.
297 Id.
298 See Brooks V. Rice, The "Triumph" of the Commons: An Analysis of Enforcement
Problems and Solutions in the Western Climate Initiative, 22 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL
Bus. & DEV. L.J. 401, 428-33 (2010) (citation omitted) (stating, in discussion of Western
Climate Initiative, that "[w]hile not typically thought of as such, the reputational incentive
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comity of how the states can work together is jeopardized," 299 a deviation from
Utah's "long history [of] working with all the basin states and Nevada" along its
"long border . ."'300 The concern about the credibility of Utah's commitment to
good-faith negotiations and cooperation was underscored by statements from the
Nevadan side, sharply criticizing Utah on this very point.3 01
The Commission's third concern, related to the second, centers on the effects
of the Agreement's rejection on regional water management cooperation. Interstate
agreements are fundamentally reciprocal in nature, and several Commissioners
expressed a well-founded fear that Utah's rejection of the deal will return to haunt
the state in its own pursuit of transboundary water resources. Thompson "publicly
link[ed]" the Snake Valley groundwater project to Utah's own proposed Lake
Powell project, which seeks to build a 139-mile pipeline to deliver, at full
development, 100,000 acre-feet per year of water from Lake Powell-part of
Utah's Upper Colorado River Compact allocation-to the Kanab and St. George
areas in Washington, Kane, and Central Iron counties. 30 2 Like the Snake Valley
Aquifer, the Lake Powell project implicates the rights of Lower Colorado River
Basin states, including Utah, as well as the Indian tribes. 3 0 3 Because of this,
Thompson said that it was "hypocritical for us [Utahns] to tell Nevada not to
is very much a type of sanction" and that "[t]hough the actual impact may be small, failure
to 'get on board' may be severe enough"). The significance of a reputation for
cooperativeness (or lack of cooperativeness) is described in the analogous international
context by Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State's Reputation, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 231,
236-37, 266 (2009) ("Reputation is a causal mechanism because it influences the future
range of cooperative activities available to the state. Without a good reputation, other states
will not want to enter into cooperative agreements that provide joint gains because of the
possibility of opportunistic defection. . . . The state will be isolated when it needs the
cooperation of other states to achieve its goals.").
299 Fahys, supra note 265.
300 Maffly, supra note 284.
301 See infra notes 309-313.
302 Maffly, supra note 284; Lake Powell Pipeline Background, Utah Div. of Water
Resources, http://www.water.utah.gov/lakepowellpipeline/Generallnformation/default.asp
(providing details and updates on the project) (last visited Jan. 14, 2014). The project was
authorized in 2006 by the Utah Legislature. Lake Powell Pipeline Development Act, 2006
Utah Laws (S.B. 27), ch. 216, eff. May 1, 2006, (codified at UTAH CODE § 73-28-101 to
405). But, it has been stalled amid opposition and declining growth in the St. George area.
Lee Davidson, Slowing Growth May Delay or Kill Lake Powell Pipeline, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Jul. 31, 2012, http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=22352959&itype=storylD; Amy Joi
O'Donoghue, Lake Powell Pipeline Foes Rejoice in Delay, DESERET NEWS, Feb. 8, 2013,
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865572677/Lake-Powell-pipeline-foes-rejoice-in-dela
y.html.
303 See Maffly, supra note 284; see generally Alice E. Walker, Protecting Sacred
Tribal Sites: The Lake Powell Pipeline Project, ASPATORE (Apr. 2013), available at 2013
WL 2136517 (discussing how the Paiute Indians might approach the pipeline project in
order to best mitigate its effects).
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develop a water project" and warned that the soured relations resulting from
rejection of the Snake Valley Aquifer Agreement would encourage Nevada to
block Utah from obtaining the necessary water rights, regulatory approvals, and
rights of way for its Lake Powell project.3 0 4 Herbert soon reaffirmed his decision to
kill the Agreement, stating in a reply letter to the Commission that he stands by his
decision to reject the deal but hoped to renegotiate for a more equitable deal in the
future.305 In July and August 2013, the Governor began a series of seven public
"listening sessions" on water issues ahead of a summit scheduled for October
2013.306
III. EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT OF INTERSTATE GROUNDWATER
If Governor Herbert does not reconsider his decision, and assuming Congress
does not intervene,307 the political death of the Snake Valley Agreement will
almost certainly lead to litigation. The negotiation of the Agreement has occurred
in the shadow of this prospect. 30 8 Now that the Agreement is likely kaput, both
Maffly, supra ncte 284. Of course, this argument did not appeal to those who are
critics of both the Lake Powell and the Snake Valley projects, who would be happy to see
both plans collapse. See id. (noting that opponents "ridiculed Thompson's position as a
self-serving gesture to protect the controversial Lake Powell Pipeline proposal");
O'Donoghue, supra note 302 (further detailing opposition and objections to Lake Powell
project).
305 Maffly, supra note 285 (noting Herbert hoped to "negotiate a new deal acceptable
to Snake Valley residents"); O'Donoghue, supra note 292 (citing a letter to the
commission).
306 These sessions were scheduled in March 2013 before the decision not to sign the
Agreement was made. Amy Joi O'Donoghue, Thirsty? Utah's Water Future Will Be
Mapped by Input in Upcoming Meetings, DESERET NEwS, July 7, 2013, http://www.deseret
news.com/article/865582750/Thirsty-Utahs-water-future-will-be-mapped-by-input-in-upco
ming-meetings.html.
307 Warren H. Peterson suggested that Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, the Senate
majority leader, could push through an amendment to the 2004 legislation allowing Nevada
to begin groundwater development in the Snake Valley without Utah's consent, telling the
Commission that "[w]e're getting ready to see a door closed here . . . ." Foy, supra note
265. But congressional apportionment is rare and politically difficult. See infra notes 381-
385 and accompanying text.
3os It is axiomatic that bargaining over legal matters occurs "in the shadow of'
existing law. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979). This is true when sovereigns
negotiate with one another, as well as when private parties negotiate with each other, or
when private parties negotiate with the state (as in plea bargaining), especially given the
uncertainty of how transboundary water disputes would be resolved in the absence of
agreement. See generally Ron M. Rosenberg, When Sovereigns Negotiate in the Shadow of
the Law: The 1998 Arizona-Pima Maricopa Gaming Compact, 4 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV.
283 (1999) (analyzing the process by which the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian
Community and the State of Arizona negotiated the first tribe-state gaming compact);
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States have sent clear signals that they expect an equitable apportionment action to
be filed by Nevada and are mobilizing for this protracted legal battle.
Following Utah's rejection of the Agreement, Nevada officials expressed
anger and disappointment. Leo Drozdoff, the Director of the Nevada Department
of Conservation and Natural Resources, stated that the agency was "disappointed
by this decision and are evaluating all of our options in light of Gov. Herbert's
decision," noting that the Snake Valley Agreement "was negotiated over many
years and in good faith . . . ."'09 Mulroy, the Southern Nevada Water Authority
(SNWA) general manager, stated that Utah's move was "an absolute slap in the
face to the State of Nevada," asking "[w]hy would any state sit down and spend
four years negotiating with Utah? . . . Their credibility has been completely
undermined." 3 10
These sentiments were echoed by other SNWA officials, who stated, "[w]e
can't simply accept the governor saying, '[w]e're not going to sign,' and live with
it . . . 'Congress directed the two states to reach an agreement. Congress did not
give one state the authority to prevent the other from developing water resources
within its own borders.' 311
Utah has also taken steps to prepare its legal defense. In 2013 the state
enacted legislation that created a new mandate for the Constitutional Defense
Council-a state body charged with "assist[ing] the governor and the Legislature"
on various types of issues, including "a disagreement with another state regarding
the use or ownership of water"-to "study, formulate, and recommend appropriate
legal strategies and arguments" in preparation for such cases. 3 12 The bill also made
one-time appropriations for Utah's interstate-dispute legal costs, and authorized
future appropriations for "asserting, defending, or litigating an issue arising with
another state regarding the use or ownership of water. . .. 13
Most likely, litigation over Snake Valley will take the form of an equitable
apportionment action between Nevada and Utah before the Supreme Court of the
United States. As detailed below, the Constitution vests the Supreme Court with
original jurisdiction to hear disputes between the states. 314 In exercising this
jurisdiction for disputes involving shared surface waters, the Supreme Court has
Benjamin L. Snowden, Bargaining in the Shadow of Uncertainty: Understanding the
Failure of the ACF and ACT Compacts, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 134 (2005) (analyzing the
failure of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact and the Alabama-
Coosa-Tallapoosa River Basin Compact for lessons on negotiation structure).
309 O'Donoghue, supra note 106.
o Foy, supra note 265.
3 Brean, supra note 31 (statement of Southern Nevada Water Authority deputy
general manager John Entsminger).
312 Constitutionalism and Federalism Defense Act, H.B. 131, ch. 101., 2013 Utah
Laws (codified at UTAH CODE § 63C-4a-203).
3 Id. (codified at UTAH CODE § 63C-4a-402).
314 See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2.
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developed and applied the doctrine of equitable apportionment. 3 5 The Snake
Valley Aquifer dispute could present the Supreme Court with its first opportunity
to apply the equitable apportionment doctrine to groundwater. 3 16 While there are
some differences between surface water and groundwater law, the resources and
policy concerns are similar enough that equitable apportionment can be adopted
and applied rationally in an interstate groundwater dispute, as demonstrated in the
recent interstate dispute between Tennessee and Mississippi in the Fifth Circuit. 3 17
After exploring the equitable apportionment doctrine and its application to
interstate groundwater disputes, this Part concludes with a brief analysis of a
potential action brought by Nevada against Utah over the Snake Valley Aquifer.
It is important to note the federalism context for equitable apportionment.
Since the enactment of the federal Clean Water Act in 1972,"'1 the federal
government has taken a central role in protecting interstate water quality.
However, Congress has generally left protection of water quantity and
management of water resources (including groundwater) to the states and is likely
to continue to do so. 3 19 States have thus developed and crafted common law and
statutory regimes to allocate and manage their water resources.
However, when water resources cross state lines and are subject to competing
legal claims and uses, federal involvement becomes necessary. Congressional
apportionment of the shared water resource has been approved by the Supreme
Court as a mechanism to resolve interstate water disputes, 32 0 but has historically
been used far less than interstate compacts. Congress has only twice used its power
to apportion waters, but both instances involved Nevada-the Boulder Canyon
Project Act 32 1 and Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act.32 2
315 See generally Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984) (Colorado II);
Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982) (Colorado I).
316 See Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1017 (1983) ("Although that
doctrine has its roots in water rights litigation, the natural resource of anadromous fish is
sufficiently similar to make equitable apportionment an appropriate mechanism for
resolving allocative disputes."). The Fifth Circuit noted this in reasoning that equitable
apportionment applies to groundwater. Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 570
F.3d 625, 630 n.6 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1319 (2010).
"' See Hood, 570 F.3d at 632.
318 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 896 (1972)
(codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376).
31 See Hall, supra note 12, at 411; see also Robert Haskell Abrams, Interstate Water
Allocation: A Contemporary Primer for Eastern States, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
155, 156 (2002) ("[Dlespite the combination of the commerce power and the Supremacy
Clause that together allow the national government to propound a meaningful water policy
with allocative features, the national government has not done so and is unlikely to do so
any time soon.").
320 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564-66 (1963).
321 Pub. L. No. 70-642, 45 Stat. 1057 (codified as amended and supplemented at 43
U.S.C. §§ 617-617v (1928)). In this Act, Congress gave its approval for the Colorado River
Compact and authorized the construction of the Hoover Dam. Margaret Bushman
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As Congress has already played a role in framing the Snake Valley dispute, further
congressional action is a viable option if the states cannot resolve the matter
amicably. 323 Absent congressional apportionment, states are left to resolve their
interstate disputes through either equitable apportionment in the Supreme Court
(the focus of this Part) or an interstate compact (explored in Part II, supra).
A. The Equitable Apportionment Doctrine
When a state party wishes to have the Supreme Court adjudicate its dispute
with another, state, it files a motion for leave to file a bill of complaint in the
Court.3 24 While the Court has original, exclusive jurisdiction over suits between
states,325 and as such jurisdiction might appear mandatory, the Court "has rejected
LaBianca, Note, The Arizona Water Bank and the Law of the River, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 659,
664 (1998). This Act remains the foundational document of the "Law of the River" today.
Douglas Kenney et al., The Colorado River and the Inevitability ofInstitutional Change, 32
PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REv. 103, 105 n.6, 140-41 (2011); James S. Lochhead, An
Upper Basin Perspective on California's Claims to Water from the Colorado River, Part 1:
the Law of the River, 4 U. DENv. WATER L. REV. 290, 291 n.5 (2001).
322 Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-618,
§ 204, 104 Stat. 3294, 3296-304 (1990).
323 See Josh Clemons, Interstate Water Disputes: A Road Map for States, 12
SOUTHEASTERN ENvTL. L.J. 115, 128 (2004); see also Douglas L. Grant, Interstate
Allocation of Rivers Before the United States Supreme Court: The Apalachicola-
Chattahoochee-Flint River System, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 401, 409-10 (2004).
Commentators are split on the desirability of congressional apportionment. Compare Reid,
supra note 277, at 177-79 (arguing that congressional apportionment is superior to other
forms of apportionment), and Charles J. Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1,
48-53 (1966) (same), with David N. Copas, Jr., The Southeastern Water Compact,
Panacea or Pandora's Box? A Law and Economics Analysis of the Viability of Interstate
Water Compacts, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 697, 714-16 (1997) (arguing
"that congressional apportionment should be avoided at all costs"). This debate is often
beside the point, as congressional intervention is not forthcoming in the vast majority of
cases. See Andrew Thomley, A Tale of Two River Basins: The Southeast Finds Itself in a
Rare Interstate Water Struggle, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 97, 98 (2005) ("Congressional
apportionment ... is a politically non-viable option .... .").
324 See Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of Judicial Process: Special
Masters in the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REv. 625, 639
(2002); see generally Vincent L. McKusick, Discretionary Gatekeeping: The Supreme
Court's Management of Its Original Jurisdiction Docket Since 1961, 45 ME. L. REv. 185
(1993) (detailing Supreme Court procedure and practice for managing its original
jurisdiction docket).
325 The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to adjudicate interstate disputes
stems from the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2 ("The Judicial Power [of the
United States] shall extend . . . to Controversies between two or more States . . . ."), while
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court to hear such disputes stems from statute, 28 U.S.C.
2013] 1601
1602 UTAH LAW REVIEW [No. 6
any notion that the presence of a state as a party is dispositive proof that the case
falls within its original jurisdiction." 3 26 The Court votes on whether to grant leave
to allow the filing of a complaint commencing an original jurisdiction action, and a
majority vote is required to grant such leave.327 Original jurisdiction cases are
exceedingly rare, with the Court docketing between zero and four per term; in the
Court's entire history, fewer than two hundred original jurisdiction cases have been
321 329decided.328 While almost all of these have been interstate disputes, only some
were interstate water disputes, and only some of these involved apportionment of
waters.
While Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity does not apply to interstate
disputes since such immunity does not extend to disputes between sovereigns, 3 30
interstate disputes face some of the same procedural hurdles as other cases.
Interstate disputes, like all cases, must be justiciable, subject to the constitutional
§ 1251(a) (2006) ("The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all
controversies between two or more States.").
326 Carstens, supra note 324, at 640. The Court has expressed concern about such fact-
intensive cases overwhelming its discretionary-appeals docket. See, e.g., Washington v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 113 (1972) ("The breadth of the constitutional grant of
this Court's original jurisdiction dictates that we be able to exercise discretion over the
cases we hear under this jurisdictional head, lest our ability to administer our appellate
docket be impaired.").
327 Carstens, supra note 324, at 639. This is in contrast to petitions to grant a writ of
certiorari, the source of the vast majority (some 95%) of the Court's docket, which require
just four votes in grant under the Court's longstanding "rule of four," which generally
provides that "the Court will schedule full briefing and oral argument whenever four
Justices agree that a case deserves plenary consideration." Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S.
Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1067, 1069 (1988).
328 17 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4042 n.1 (3d ed. 2007) (providing a term-by-term summary
of original-jurisdiction cases from 1983 to 2003); Carstens, supra note 324, at 638-39
(noting that "[a]s of the late 1990s, the Court has decided roughly 170 original jurisdiction
cases in its more than two hundred years of existence").
329 The modern statute provides that the Supreme Court has "original and exclusive
jurisdiction" over only "controversies between two or more States," and "original but not
exclusive jurisdiction of all actions or proceedings to which ambassadors, other public
ministers, consuls, or vice consuls of foreign states are parties"; "controversies between the
United States and a State"; and "actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens of
another State or against aliens." 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006). There have been "only two cases
prosecuted to judgment on the merits" under the other basis for the Court's original
jurisdiction-that of "actions or proceedings to which ambassadors, other public ministers,
consuls, or vice consuls of foreign states are parties." WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra
note 328, § 4050 (identifying the only two cases as Casey v. Galli, 94 U.S. 673 (1876) and
Jones v. Le Tombe, 3 U.S. 384 (3 Dall. 1798)).
330 See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991);
Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 328 (1934); South Dakota v. North
Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 318 (1904).
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limits of the Case or Controversy Clause of Article 111,331 as well as judicially
created prudential doctrines.
It is well established that interstate water disputes are justiciable and are not
subject to the political-question doctrine since the creation of original jurisdiction
for interstate disputes made clear that the Court has a duty to adjudicate even these
sensitive and politically charged questions. 332 Standing is almost always present in
major interstate water disputes since such disputes either directly implicate
sovereign interests or are subject to the doctrine of parens patriae.3 3 3 The doctrines
of mootness 334 and ripeness 33 5 also apply. In interstate water disputes a controversy
is ripe when the case is of "serious magnitude and fully and clearly proved" so as
to warrant adjudication by the Court.3 36 Thus, a "potential threat of injury,
representing as it does only a possibility for the indefinite future, is no basis for a
decree in an interstate suit" because the Court "cannot issue declaratory
decrees." 337 Put differently, the Court "will not exert its extraordinary power to
control the conduct of one State at the suit of another, unless the threatened
invasion of rights is of serious magnitude and established by clear and convincing
33 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
332 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 328, § 4051 ("And as the remedies
resorted to by independent States for the determination of controversies raised by collision
between them were withdrawn from the States by the Constitution, a wide range of matters,
susceptible of adjustment, and not purely political in their nature, was made justiciable by
that instrument.") (citing Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 141 (1902)); see also South
Carolina v. North Carolina, 558 U.S. 256, 267 (2010) ("this Court exercises . .. jurisdiction
to resolve controversies between States that, if arising among independent nations, 'would
be settled by treaty or by force') (quoting Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907));
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 608 (1945). The Court stated that over-appropriation
of water "has precipitated a clash of interests which between sovereign powers could be
traditionally settled only by diplomacy or war. The original jurisdiction of this Court is one
of the alternative methods provided by the Framers of our Constitution." Id.
3 South Carolina, 558 U.S. at 274 ("[A] State's sovereign interest in ensuring an
equitable share of an interstate river's water is precisely the type of interest that the State,
as parens patriae, represents on behalf of its citizens."); see also 8 1A C.J.S. States § 530
(2013) (explaining doctrine of parens patriae); Romualdo P.. Eclavea, Annotation, State's
Standing to Sue on Behalf of its Citizens, 42 A.L.R. FED. 23 (1979).
334 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 328, § 4051 ("Original jurisdiction cases
are likely to involve enduring disputes. But if the dispute should disappear by settlement or
otherwise, there is little reason to suppose that the principles of mootness should be any
different for original actions than for other actions.") (citing Arkansas v. Texas, 351 U.S.
977 (1956) (dismissing interstate original jurisdiction case as moot)).
335 Id.
336 Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 393 & n.8 (1943) (citing Missouri v. Illinois,
200 U.S. 496, 520-21 (1906) (Missouri II) and five other interstate original jurisdiction
cases).
337 Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 608 (1945) (citing Arizona v. California,
283 U.S. 423, 462-64 (1931)).
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evidence."33 8 Perhaps this is rooted in the idea that original jurisdiction "is one of
the mighty instruments which the framers of the Constitution provided so that
adequate machinery might be available for the peaceful settlement of disputes
between States" and, thus, not appropriate for de minimis disputes. 3 39 Accordingly,
the Court has a number of times rejected (without opinion) a state's motion for
leave to file a complaint invoking the Court's original jurisdiction, 34 0 taking as
"relevant considerations . . . not only the seriousness and dignity of the claim, but
also the availability of another forum." 34 1
Water apportionment cases present "[p]articularly close questions" of
justiciability. 34 2 The Court has held that where the dependable natural flow of a
stream is insufficient to meet all appropriate rights, "the clash of interests"
involved is "of that character and dignity" to make the controversy justiciable,
even if water has not yet begun to be withdrawn as part of the project at issue.343
Once the prerequisites of standing are established, analysis on the merits of
equitable apportionment begins. Equitable apportionment rests on two related
rationales. The first, explained by Justice Holmes, is a practical one: water is a
"necessity of life that must be rationed among those who have power over it," and
where two states "have real and substantial interests" in interstate water, those
interests "must be reconciled as best they may be." 3" The second, derived from
our constitutional scheme and international law,345 respects the states as
338 Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 669 (1931).
3 Georgia v. Penn. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 450 (1945).
340 E.g., California v. West Virginia, 454 U.S. 1027, 1027 (1981) (denying motion for
leave to file bill of complaint in case concerning "alleged breach of contract covering
athletic contests between two state universities" without opinion); see also id. at 1028
(Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of motion for leave to file bill of complaint) ("The fact
that two sovereign States have been unable to resolve this matter without adding to our
burdens does not speak well for the statesmanship of either party but does not, in my
opinion, justify our refusal to exercise our exclusive jurisdiction .
341 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 328, § 4053.342 Id. at§ 4051.
343 Nebraska, 325 U.S. at 609-10 ("The fact that Colorado's proposed projects are not
planned for the immediate future is not conclusive in view of the present over-
appropriation of natural flow.").
344 New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342-43 (1931).
345 The principle that the states of the United States are juridically equal is analogous
to the international-law principle that sovereign states are juridically equal to one another.
See Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International Law and
State Sovereignty, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1027, 1027-33 (2002) (noting that "the Founders
understood the States as sovereign entities bound together in an interdependent coexistence
very much like the community of nations," and suggesting that the Eleventh Amendment is
"consistent with the sovereign equality principle, presuming no difference between the
sovereign dignity of a State and a nation-state, a powerful statement in itself about the
sovereign dignity of the American states"); see also ROBERT A. KLEIN, SOVEREIGN
EQUALITY AMONG STATES: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 143 (1974).
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sovereigns: the sovereign states are juridical equals and have "equality of right"
among them. 346 Because of this, whenever
the action of one state reaches, through the agency of natural laws, into
the territory of another state, the question of the extent and the
limitations of the rights of the two states becomes a matter of justiciable
dispute between them, and this court is called upon to settle that dispute
in such a way as will recognize the equal rights of both and at the same
time establish justice between them. 34 7
Of course, equality of right does not mean an "equal division of the water," but
instead means an "equal level or plane on which all the states stand, in point of
power and right, under our constitutional system."348
Equitable apportionment is a doctrine of federal common law. 3 49 "It is a
flexible doctrine which calls for 'the exercise of an informed judgment on a
consideration of many factors to secure a 'just and equitable' allocation," taking
into account 'the delicate adjustment of interests which must be made."' 350 The
Court has said it approaches interstate water cases "[s]itting, as it were, as an
international, as well as a domestic, tribunal," and applying "[fjederal law, state
law, and international law, as the exigencies of the particular case may
demand....
Determining what "equity" means in water law is highly challenging.352 The
adaptive nature of equity allows flexibility in a range of highly fact-dependent and
often technical interstate apportionment cases, but makes articulating standards and
346 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907).
347 Id. at 97-98. This test, with its mention of "reaching through the agency of natural
laws," indicates that any interstate flow resource, whether surface water, groundwater, or
migratory fish, may be subject to equitable apportionment. See infra Part III.
348 Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419,465 (1922).
349 Hinderlider v. LaPlata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938)
(Brandeis, J.) ("For whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between
the two States is a question of 'federal common law' upon which neither the statutes nor
the decisions of either State can be conclusive."). Congress has the power to displace the
federal common law of equitable apportionment under its Commerce Clause powers, as it
has displaced the common law of nuisance for interstate water pollution by enacting the
Clean Water Act. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317-19 (1981)
(Milwaukee II). But Congress has chosen not to do so.
350 Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982) (Colorado 1) (quoting
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945)).
351 Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 146-47 (1902).
352 For a consideration of meaning of equity in the water-law context, see Jason A.
Robison & Douglas S. Kenney, Equity and the Colorado River Compact, 42 ENvTL. L.
1157, 1174-81 (2012).
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deciding cases difficult. 35 3 The intrinsically subjective nature of equity, along with
a relative small body of interstate water law cases, means that equitable
apportionment cases are frequently unpredictable. 3 54
The Court has, however, laid down a number of key principles in the form of
a multifactor balancing test that guides how it will equitably apportion water. 355
The Court has said that its aim is "always to secure a just and equitable
apportionment 'without quibbling over formulas.'" 35 6 The Court will
consider all relevant factors, including "physical and climatic conditions,
the consumptive use of water in the several sections of the river, the
character and rate of return flows, the extent of established uses, the
availability of storage water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on
downstream areas, [and] the damage to upstream areas as compared to
the benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the
former."357
When "both states recognize the doctrine of prior appropriation, priority becomes
the 'guiding principle' in an allocation between the competing states."35 8 But the
Court has stressed that "state law is not controlling" and that "the just
apportionment of interstate waters is a question of federal law that depends 'upon a
consideration of the pertinent laws of the contending States and all other relevant
facts."'359
That "the rule of priority is not the sole criterion" was underscored in the
360Court's 1982 decision in Colorado v. New Mexico. In this case, Justice Marshall
wrote:
353 See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles Over Rivers: The Southeastern
States and the Struggle Over the 'Hooch, 12 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 828, 883 (2005) ("Finding
a fair apportionment of the water between two or more competing states is as difficult as
devising a reasonable apportionment of water between two competing private riparian
users.").
354 Douglas L. Grant, Collaborative Solutions to Colorado River Water Shortages:
The Basin States' Proposal and Beyond, 8 NEV. L.J. 964, 991 (2008) ("Equitable
apportionment requires the weighing of multiple factors that are incommensurable, and
there is a dearth of precedent on how to weigh competing factors. For these reasons,
unpredictability is the hallmark of equitable apportionment litigation.").
3 For an excellent overview of the application of the equitable apportionment
doctrine, see A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of Equitable Apportionment Revisited, Updated,
and Restated, 56 U. COLo. L. REv. 381, 392 (1985).
356 Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (quoting New Jersey v. New York,
283 U.S. 336, 343 (1931) (Holmes, J.)).
3 Id. (quoting Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945)).
358 Id. at 183-84 (quoting Nebraska, 325 U.S. at 618).
359 Id. at 184 (quoting Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670-71 (1931)).
360 Id. at 188.
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We recognize that the equities supporting the protection of existing
economies will usually be compelling. The harm that may result from
disrupting established uses is typically certain and immediate, whereas
the potential benefits from a proposed diversion may be speculative and
remote. Under some circumstances, however, the countervailing equities
supporting a diversion for future use in one state may justify the
detriment to existing users in another state. This may be the case, for
example, where the state seeking a diversion demonstrates by clear and
convincing evidence that the benefits of the diversion substantially
outweigh the harm that might result. In the determination of whether the
state proposing the diversion has carried this burden, an important
consideration is whether the existing users could offset the diversion by
reasonable conservation measures to prevent waste. This approach
comports with our emphasis on flexibility in equitable apportionment
and also accords sufficient protection to existing uses.361
The Court has continued to reaffirm that "equitable apportionment ... should
turn on the benefits, harms, and efficiencies of competing uses . ... 362 At the
same time, the Court has continued to give teeth to the requirement that the state
seeking a diversion prove
by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of certain relevant
factors . . . . [F]or example, the extent to which reasonable conservation
measures can adequately compensate for the reduction in supply due to
the diversion, and the extent to which the benefits from the diversion will
outweigh the harms to existing users. 3 63
Additionally, "[t]his evidentiary burden cannot be met with generalizations about
unidentified conservation measures and unstudied speculation about future
uses." 364 Thus, the Court has retained significant roles for both utilitarian analysis
and for preservation of historic rights.
B. Applying the Equitable Apportionment Doctrine to Groundwater
Although the Supreme Court has never before explicitly adjudicated an
interstate dispute over groundwater,36 5 it has considered groundwater issues within
361 Id at 187-88.
362 Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 323 (1984) (Colorado ll).
363 Id. at 323-24.
Id. at 324..
365 Hesser, supra note 275, at 36 ("The Supreme Court has only equitably apportioned
interstate surface waters . . . ."); A. Dan Tarlock & Darcy Alan Frownfelter, State
Groundwater Sovereignty After Sporhase: The Case of the Hueco Bolson, 43 OKLA. L.
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the equitable apportionment of groundwater-connected surface water. Over a
century ago, the Supreme Court recognized that groundwater flowing alongside the
Arkansas River should be treated as part of the flow of the river in an interstate
equitable-apportionment case.366 Moreover, the Court has applied the equitable-
apportionment doctrine in an interstate dispute outside of the surface water
context; in Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon,36 7 the Court held that interstate runs of
anadromous fish, such as salmon and steelhead trout, were a resource that could be
equitably apportioned, explicitly drawing parallels to water law. 3 6 8
Further, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that interstate
groundwater is subject to the equitable apportionment doctrine. In Hood ex rel.
Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 369 the court was faced with an interstate dispute
between Mississippi and Tennessee over the Memphis Sand Aquifer, which lies
beneath the territory of both states. 3 7 0 The Memphis Sand Aquifer is replenished
primarily from precipitation that occurs in western Tennessee 371 and is the primary
water supply for Memphis, Tennessee. The Memphis Light, Gas and Water
Division (MLGW), a unit of the City of Memphis, 372 supplies over 257,000
customers through the Memphis Sand Aquifer, operating ten water pumps and 175
wells through the county.373
As a result of the extensive pumping to supply water to Memphis, a cone of
depression has formed.374 This is a reduction of water levels centered around
REv. 27, 27 (1990) ("[T]he United States Supreme Court had never directly equitably
apportioned an aquifer .... .").
366 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 114-15 (1907); see also Washington v. Oregon,
297 U.S. 517, 524-26 (1936) (surface waters in dispute were hydrologically connected to
subterranean waters, and reasonableness of well-pumping was part of conflict).
367 462 U.S. 1017 (1983).
368 Id. at 1024 ("Although that doctrine has its roots in water rights litigation, the
natural resource of anadromous fish is sufficiently similar to make equitable apportionment
an appropriate mechanism for resolving allocative disputes."). The Fifth Circuit noted this
in reasoning that equitable apportionment applies to groundwater. Hood ex rel. Mississippi
v. City of Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 630 n.6 (5th Cir. 2009).
369 570 F.3d 625 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1319 (2010).
370 Hood, 570 F.3d at 627.
371 W.S. PARKS & J.K. CARMICHAEL, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER-RESOURCES
INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 88-4182, GEOLOGY AND GROUND-WATER RESOURCES OF THE
MEMPHIS SAND IN WESTERN TENNESSEE 7 (1990), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/wri/wr
ir88-4182/pdf/wrir 88-4182 a.pdf.
372 Hood, 570 F.3d at 627.
3 About, MEMPHIS LIGHT, GAS & WATER DIv., http://www.mlgw.com/about/ (last
visited Jan. 12, 2014).
374 DAVID LEWIS FELDMAN & JULIA 0. ELMENDORF, ENERGY, ENV'T & RES. CTR.,
UNIV. OF TENNESSEE-KNOXVILLE, WATER SUPPLY CHALLENGES FACING TENNESSEE: CASE
STUDY ANALYSES AND THE NEED FOR LONG-TERM PLANNING 55 (2000), available at http:
//eerc.ra.utk.edu/divisions/wrrc/water _supply/Report.PDF (report prepared for the
Environmental Policy Office, Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation).
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Memphis's pumping wells, causing a change in the natural movement, or gradient,
of the aquifer's water. Thus, the water in the Mississippi portion of the Memphis
Sand Aquifer has allegedly been diverted to Tennessee's territory.3 75
The subsequent change in gradient from Mississippi's portion of the aquifer to
the Memphis area spurred Mississippi's attorney general to file a lawsuit against
Memphis, leading to the first reported case concerning an interstate subsurface
water dispute.3 76 Mississippi alleged that the water held in the Mississippi portion
of the aquifer is Mississippi's sovereign property 37 7 and that this water has been
taken due to Memphis drawing more water than it can replenish in the aquifer. 378
Mississippi sought compensation in the form of past and future damages, and
equitable relief.3 79
The first case was brought in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Mississippi. 3 80 An initial issue before the district court was the City of
Memphis's attempt to join the State of Tennessee as a defendant party. 1 The
burden of disputing the joinder fell on Mississippi, who opposed it.38 2 The court
ultimately rejected Mississippi's claim that only Mississippi water was involved in
the lawsuit,383 stating relief could not be granted until it was determined "which
portion of the aquifer's water is the property of which State."384 The court cited the
Supreme Court's precedent of applying equitable' apportionment for resolving
3 See Alan B. Cameron, Mississippi v. Memphis: A Study in Transboundary Ground
Water Dispute Resolution, SEA GRANT L. & POL'Y J., at 2 n.1, http://nsglc.olemiss.edu/
SGLPJ/Presentations 09/cameron.pdf (citing to extensive reports about the aquifer
diversions); see also J.V. Brahana & R. E. Broshears, Hydrogeology and Ground- Water
Flow in the Memphis and Fort Pillow Aquifers in the Memphis Area, Tennessee, U.S.
DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, WATER RESOURCES INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 89-4131 (2001),
available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/wri/wri89413 1/pdf/wri89-413 1.pdf; Potential for Leakage
Among Principal Aquifers in the Memphis Area, Tennessee, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
WATER-RESOURCES INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 85-4295 (1986), available at http://pubs.usgs
.gov/wri/wri85-4295/pdf/wrir_85-4295_a.pdf; Gerald K. Moore, Geology and Hydrology
of the Claiborne Group in Western Tennessee, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, WATER-
SUPPLY PAPER 1809-F (1965), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/ wsp/1 809f/report.pdf.
376 Hood, ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 533 F. Supp. 2d 646, 648 (N.D.
Miss. 2008).
3 Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 627 (5th Cir. 2009)
("Mississippi alleges that part of the groundwater that Memphis pumps from the Aquifer is
Mississippi's sovereign property and that the state must therefore be compensated.").
378id.
3 79 id.
31o Hood, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 646.
311 Id. at 647.
382 id
383 Id. at 649.
384 Id. at 648.
2013] 1609
UTAH LAW REVIEW
interstate water disputes, concluding that the Supreme Court would have to
apportion Memphis Sand Aquifer between the two states.
The district court ultimately found that Tennessee was a necessary and
indispensable party, but that it did not have the jurisdiction to join the state. 38 6 The
court reasoned that joining Tennessee was necessary "because in its absence
complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties to the action."387
As the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction for controversies
between two or more states, 388 the district court reasoned that Mississippi would
have an adequate remedy.if the action were dismissed because the state would be
able "to petition the Supreme Court for apportionment of the waters of the
Memphis Sands aquifer in a suit that properly joins . . . the State of Tennessee."389
Since not joining Tennessee would result in extreme prejudice, but there were still
options available to the plaintiffs, the district court dismissed the case without
prejudice. As only the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction for disputes
between states,390 the opinion intimated that Mississippi should pursue the action
through this channel.
Instead, Mississippi appealed the district court's ruling to dismiss the case to
the Fifth Circuit.39 1 Mississippi again argued that Tennessee was not an
indispensable party because the suit did not involve Tennessee's sovereign
interests.3 92 Mississippi further argued against the equitable apportionment of the
Memphis Sand Aquifer, claiming that it owned the groundwater resources within
its sovereign territory.393
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court and held that the Memphis Sand
Aquifer was an interstate water source and that allocation of the resource must
happen "before one state may sue an entity for invading its share." 394 The court
rejected the argument that Mississippi owned a "fixed resource" interest in the
aquifer water, stating that water "is not a fixed resource like a mineral seam, but
instead migrates across state boundaries."3 95 The Fifth Circuit pointed to Supreme
Court precedent that ruled that state boundaries do not determine the amount of
water a state is entitled to in regards to an interstate source. 39 6 Thus, the court
385 Id.
Id. at 651.
387 Id. at 649.
388 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).
389 Hood, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 650.
390 28 U.S.C. § 125 1(a).
391 Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 570 F.3d 625 (5th Cir. 2009).
392 Id. at 629.
393 id
394 Id. at 629-30 (citing Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304
U.S. 92 (1938)).
"'Id. at 630.396 Id. at 630-31.
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concluded that the aquifer had to be allocated like other interstate water sources
that were subject to multistate disputes:
The fact that this particular water source is located underground, as
opposed to resting above ground ... is of no analytical significance. The
Aquifer flows, if slowly, under several states, and it is indistinguishable
from a lake bordered by multiple states or from a river bordering several
states depending upon it for water.m
The Fifth Circuit concluded that "a judgment rendered in Tennessee's absence
would be enormously prejudicial to Tennessee's sovereign interest in its water
rights" 398 and that Mississippi would still have an adequate remedy if the suit was
dismissed, by petitioning the Supreme Court. 3 99 Mississippi filed a petition for writ
of certiorari to the Supreme Court.4 00 Again Mississippi argued that the
groundwater was not a shared natural resource and that equitable apportionment
was not required, nor appropriate for the pursued action-since Mississippi was
not challenging Tennessee's "sovereignty over ground water within" the state, and
Tennessee had not moved to intervene, then there was no controversy between the
states.40' Mississippi also contended that their own statutory and legal authority
gave them authority over both ground and surface waters within Mississippi state
402 403boundaries.4 02 The Supreme Court denied certiorari, letting the Fifth Circuit's
holding stand-another indicator that the Court views interstate groundwater as
subject to the equitable apportionment doctrine.
C. Equitable Apportionment of the Snake Valley Aquifer
From the above discussion, there is strong precedent to apply the equitable
apportionment doctrine to interstate groundwater resources. But how would the
doctrine apply in practice? The Memphis Sand Aquifer dispute gives only a few
clues, suggesting the importance of meeting the Supreme Court's jurisdictional
thresholds to accept original jurisdiction. For a more detailed exploration of the
application of equitable apportionment factors to interstate groundwater, the Snake
Valley Aquifer dispute presents an ideal case study. Assuming the Supreme Court
would grant original jurisdiction (which seems likely, as discussed supra), the
Court's factors announced in Colorado v. New Mexico (Colorado 1)404 provide a
397 Id. at 630.
398 Id. at 633.
399 id
400 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 130 S. Ct. 1319
(2010) (No. 09-289), 2009 WL 2876189.
401 Id. at 14.
402 Id. at 17.
403 Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 130 S. Ct. 1319 (2010).
404 459 U.S. 176 (1982).
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useful framework for determining an equitable apportionment of a shared water
resource:
(1) the existing uses of water from [the Snake Valley Aquifer], and the
extent to which present levels of use reflect current or historical water
shortages or the failure of existing users to develop their uses diligently;
(2) the available supply of water from [the Snake Valley Aquifer],
accounting for factors such as variations in streamflow, the needs of
current users for a continuous supply, the possibilities of equalizing and
enhancing the water supply through water storage and conservation, and
the availability of substitute sources of water to relieve the demand for
water from the [shared water resource];
(3) the extent to which reasonable conservation measures in both states
might eliminate waste and inefficiency in the use of water from [the
Snake Valley Aquifer];
(4) the precise nature of the proposed interim and ultimate use in
[Nevada] of water from [the Snake Valley Aquifer], and the benefits that
would result from a diversion to [Nevada];
(5) the injury, if any, that [Utah] would likely suffer as a result of any
such diversion, taking into account the extent to which reasonable
conservation measures could offset the diversion.405
Further, the Supreme Court would consider the relevant state law doctrines and
potential claims for interstate nuisance alleged by Utah.
1. Existing Uses of Snake Valley Aquifer
Around 10,425 acre-feet of water from the aquifer under Snake Valley is used
each year in Nevada.40 6 Irrigation comprises the vast majority of use: 10,325 acre-
feet per year, or 99% of use. 4 07 The remainder is used for minor domestic, quasi-
municipal, commercial, and stock watering purposes.40 8
Around 26,637 acre-feet of water are drawn from the aquifer under Snake
Valley in Utah.4 09 Like Nevada, irrigation comprises the vast majority of uses in
405 Id. at 189-90.
406 Utah Water Rights Analysis, UTAH Div. OF WATER RIGHTS, http://waterrights.utah.
gov/snakeValleyAgreement/tabulation.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2014) (follow "snake_
surface_underground analysis" hyperlink to Excel spreadsheet, then select the "Sources
and Uses Tabulation" tab, then scroll down to "Snake Valley Summary of Permitted
Rights").
407 id
408 id
409 id
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Utah (25,638 acre-feet per year, or 96% of use). 41 0 The remaining 4% of water is
used for domestic and stockwatering purposes.
2. Available Supply from Snake Valley Aquifer: Variations in Regeneration, Needs
of Current Users for Continuous Supply, Ways to Enhance/Equalize Supply via
Storage/Conservation, Availability of Substitute Sources to Relieve Demand
The available water supply from the Snake Valley Aquifer is determined
through the recharge rate, taking into account related factors of variability, storage,
and substitute sources. Recharge of the aquifer occurs in the form of snowpack and
precipitation runoff from nearby mountain ranges,412 primarily in Nevada, and the
majority of consumptive use and groundwater discharge occurs in Utah.4 13 The
recharge rate for Snake Valley has been calculated by the USGS to be 111,000
acre-feet per year.414 However, reports have varied on this point, and on average
the recharge rate determined is around 100,000 acre-feet per year.4 15 The annual
discharge in Snake Valley has been calculated at 132,000 acre-feet per year.4 16 The
historic variability will likely increase with climate change. "Climate variability
and the climate periods used [in calculating these estimates] add uncertainty to the
recharge estimates."417 The difference in these two statistics is offset by
groundwater "entering or exiting a valley as interbasin ground-water flow,"
moving primarily from Nevada into Utah.418 A smaller amount of water leaves
Snake Valley and moves north into the Great Salt Lake Desert regional flow
system (presumably holding saline water from the Great Salt Lake at bay), while a
410id
411 Id. Domestic uses are listed under the "quasi-municipal" label, referring to
nonmunicipal corporations that provide water for domestic supply, such as a water district.
1 MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 2:17 (3d ed. 2013); 94 C.J.S. Water § 605 (2013). Quasi-
municipal uses range from water supplied by a large water district to a single domestic well
used by multiple dwellings. See generally Michael J. Pearce, Quasi-Municipal Water
Districts in Arizona: A Review of Statutory Formulae, 23 ARIz. L. REv. 883 (1981)
(examining the nature of municipal water delivery in Arizona and offering proposed
statutory modifications); Frequently Asked Questions, NEv. Div. OF WATER RES.,
http://water.nv.gov/faq/water.cfm (last updated Jan. 8, 2014).
412 BARCASS, supra note 23, at 45.
413 Final Proposed Agreement, supra note 10, at §2.6.
4 14 BARCASS, supra note 23, at 2.
41 THOMAS MYERS, GREAT BASIN WATER NETWORK AND THE FEDERATED TRIBES OF
THE GOSHUTE INDIANS, HYDROGEOLOGY OF SPRING VALLEY AND SURROUNDING AREAS 19
(2011), available at http://www.water.nv.gov/hearings/past/springetal/ (select "exhibits,"
then "GBWN exhibits," and then "GBWN_Exh_001").
416 BARCASS, supra note 23, at 2.
417 Id. at 48.
418 Id. at 4, 70-71 (noting that Snake Valley has a deficit in total amount of
groundwater if interbasin flows are not accounted for and referring to fig. 41, showing the
direction of water flow).
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significant amount moves south into the White River Valley, and some water exits
the area to the northwest, as well, into the regional flow systems of the Butte and
Ruby valleys.
Most current uses of the water are for irrigation of crops, and, thus, year-
round supply is not needed. Nonirrigative uses are around 1,000 acre-feet per year.
However, there is no realistic alternative source available. Nevada is apportioned
300,000 acre-feet of water each year under the Colorado River Compact.4 20 Utah
receives over four times as much, at 1,369,000 acre-feet of water each year from
the Colorado River.42 '
3. Extent to Which Reasonable Conservation in Each State Might Eliminate
Waste/Inefficiency in Use of Water from the Snake Valley Aquifer.
Since the vast majority of Nevada's proposed groundwater withdrawal of
51,000 acre-feet of water422 would be destined for the Las Vegas metropolitan
area, the water conservation efforts undertaken in Las Vegas are an important
consideration. While improved conservation measures could be taken in the areas
of Nevada near Snake Valley, there is relatively little waste that would occur in the
transportation of water to Las Vegas (via closed pipeline) 423 and eventual use for
municipal water supply.
419 Id. at 70 (estimating 7,000 acre-feet moving north, and 39,000 acre-feet moving
south in a given year, and 8,000 acre-feet moving northwest).
420 See Boulder Canyon Project, 43 U.S.C. § 617c (2006) (requiring ratification of the
Colorado River Compact and specifying 300,000 acre-feet to Nevada).
421 See Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, art. III (a) (1948), UTAH CODE ANN.§ 73-13-10 (West 2004). The Compact allots Utah 23% of the,7,500,000 acre-feet specified
in the 1922 Colorado River Compact. Each Colorado River Compact state's share is
generally reduced pro rata in times of drought. See Colorado River Compact, arts. III, IV
(1922). Utah's share has subsequently been reduced due to drought and other factors. See
D. Larry Anderson, Utah's Perspective: The Colorado River, UTAH Div. OF WATER RES.,
at 4-5, 8 (2002), available at http://www.water.utah.gov/interstate/thecoloradoriverart.pdf
(stating that Utah's share of the Colorado River is currently 1,369,000 afy).
422 Henry Brean, BLM Signs Off on Water Pipeline, But Spares Snake Valley, LAS
VEGAS REv.-J., Aug. 2, 2012, http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/nevada-and-west/blm-s
igns-water-pipeline-spares-snake-valley.
423 Well-designed, newly built water infrastructure, together with good monitoring
practices, would minimize waste. See HENRY Liu, PIPELINE ENGINEERING 387 (2003). Liu
notes that "[t]he danger or seriousness of pipeline leaks and rupture depends mainly on the
type of fluid transported through the pipe"; because water is a "mostly benign" fluid, a
leak, though it is "a cause for concern and requires action," would "not affect public safety,
nor .. . damage the environment." Id.
1614 [No. 6
INTERSTATE GROUNDWATER LAW
Since the 1980s, Las Vegas has taken many steps toward increasing water
efficiency. 424 In 2002 nearly 70% of Las Vegas's use occurred outdoors. 425 The
SNWA has "taken the lead in providing incentives for additional outdoor
conservation measures, including rain sensors, irrigation controllers, and pool
covers." 426 In 1999 the SNWA instituted a "cash for grass" turf-rebate program, in
which residents were paid to remove grass lawns altogether (at up to $1.50 per
square foot removed).427 The program has paid out some $167.8 million to both
residential and commercial landowners since its inception and saves an estimated
8.4 million gallons (approximately twenty-six acre-feet) of water annually. 428
Some 90% of the SNWA's cumulative water conservation budget was being spent
on turf removal between 2000 and 2005.429 The city also limited the hours and
days on which residents may ,use water for watering plants and washing cars,
restricted the operation of commercial car washes, limited the refilling of
swimming pools and hot tubs, and required all ornamental fountains to recirculate
water. 430
The city's famous resorts along the Las Vegas Strip use water conservation
techniques, such as double plumbing and capturing and reusing water from sinks
and showers to the extent that only three percent of the city's water goes to the Las
Vegas Strip.4 3 1 Water budgets have been imposed on the region's four-dozen golf
courses.432 Fines are levied for noncompliance with all of these regulations.4 33 Las
Vegas also introduced conservation pricing-tiered billing for water use. Water
officials have also begun to crack down on well owners who take more than their
424 ROBERT J. GLENNON, UNQUENCHABLE: AMERICA'S WATER CRISIS AND WHAT To
Do ABOUT IT 9-11 (2009) (outlining the many water conservation measures implemented
in Las Vegas).
425 Id. at 12.
426 HEATHER COOLEY ET AL., PAC. INST., HIDDEN OASIS: WATER CONSERVATION AND
EFFICIENCY IN LAS VEGAS 26-27 (2007), available at http://www.pacinst.org/reports/las_v
egas/hidden_oasis.pdf (comparing Southern Nevada Water Authority favorably to the
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (Los Angeles area); Seattle Public
Utilities; Irvine Ranch Water District (Orange County, California); Albuquerque-Bernalillo
County Water Utility Authority; and City of Tucson).
427 Henry Brean, Turf-Rebate Program Sees Success, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Feb. 21,
2011, http://www.lvrj.com/news/turf-rebate-program-sees-success- 116586443.html.
428 id.
429 COOLEY et al., supra note 426 at 29.
430 Dave Kavanaugh, Very Dry Winter Forces Las Vegas, N.M., To Act,
ALBUQUERQUE J. Jan. 31, 2006, http://www.abqjournal.com/news/state/429232nm01-31-0
6.htm.
41 GLENNON, supra note 424, at 13. .
432 David Owen, Drying Out: America's Courses Are Curbing Their Addiction to
Water, GOLF DIGEST (Nov. 2009), http://www.golfdigest.com/magazine/2009-1 1/environ
ment davidowen waterconservation.
433 GLENNON, supra note 424, at 12.
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permits allow, imposing large fines pursuant to a 2007 state law.434 Today, Las
Vegas recycles virtually 100% of its water.4 3 5 Nevada also entered into an
agreement with Arizona to bank 1.2 million acre-feet of water in an Arizona
aquifer at a cost to Las Vegas of $330 million, although Arizona no longer banks
water for Las Vegas.43 6
The "dramatic conservation scheme" that Las Vegas began in 1989 has been
phenomenally successful.43 7 The statistics tell the tale: total water use in 2009 for
the Las Vegas metropolitan area was "almost exactly what it was in 1999"
although the area grew by 685,000 people over the same period.4 3 8 The population
in Las Vegas grew by 330,000 from 2002 to 2006, yet annual water use decreased
by 18 billion gallons over the same period.439 Over the last two decades, per capita
water use in Las Vegas for all purposes has fallen dramatically, from 350 gallons
per day to 165 gallons per day.440 This is not to say that Las Vegas could not do
even better.4" But it does indicate a remarkable level of water-conservation
success.
In contrast to Nevada's experience, Utah has taken few steps toward
conservation, especially in the region surrounding the Snake Valley Aquifer. A
recent study of state laws and policies on water efficiency and conservation
conducted by the Alliance for Water Efficiency and the Environmental Law
Institute gave Utah a grade of C+, while giving Nevada a B-.442
434 Stephanie Tavares, Water Officials to Crack Down on Overuse of Private Wells,
LAS VEGAS SUN, May 29, 2009, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/may/29/water-off
icials-crack-down-overuse-private-wells/.
435 Q&A: Pat Mulroy on Las Vegas and the Journey to Water Efficiency, CIRCLE OF
BLUE (Oct. 12, 2012, 12:38 PM), http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2012/world/qa-pa
t-mulroy-on-las-vegas-and-the-joumey-to-water-efficiency (interview of Patricia Mulroy
by J. Carl Ganter at the Fifth Annual WaterSmart Innovations Conference in Las Vegas).
436 GLENNON, supra note 424, at 9-11.
437 FISHMAN, supra note 64, at 58.
438 id.439 Id. at 13.
440 Nevada Water Director Criticizes Utah, KSL.COM (Apr. 14, 2010, 9:25 PM),
http://www.ksl.com/?nid=148&sid=10387603 (citing the Great Basin Water Network's
water-use figures). Cf GLENNON, supra note 424, at 12 (stating that per capita water
consumption in Las Vegas in the late 1980s was 350 gpd).
44 Nevada ' Water Director Criticizes Utah, supra note 440 (reporting that Los
Angeles, Tucson, and Albuquerque have lower per capita water consumption than Las
Vegas, at 125 gpd, 114 gpd, and 110 gpd, respectively).
442 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY & ENVTL. LAW INST., THE WATER EFFICIENCY
AND CONSERVATION STATE SCORECARD: AN ASSESSMENT OF LAWS AND POLICIES 5, 56,
64 (2012), available at http://www.allianceforwaterefficiency.org/uploadedFiles/News/
NewsArticles/NewsArticleResources/AWE-State-Scorecard-Report-Final-September-2012
.pdf.
1616 [No. 6
INTERSTATE GROUNDWATER LAW
While Utah has made strides in water conservation recently, 443 the state
remains "America's most wasteful water user."4 " In 2006 Utah's average monthly
water price per gallon was $1.35 per 1,000 gallons; in contrast, Nevada's water
price was $2.80 per 1,000 gallons.445 This meant that the cost of water in Utah was
43% below the national average and 45% below the average for western states,
while the cost of water in Nevada was 18% above the national average and 16%
above the average for western states.446 While many factors contribute to the cost
of water,44 7 cheap water encourages unsustainable agricultural and land use
practices and is often an indicator of waste and inefficiency." 8 Indeed, per capita
consumption of water is 165 gallons per day in Las Vegas, -while per capita
consumption of water in Salt Lake City is much higher at 240 gallons per day, and
consumption in the fast-growing St. George, Utah area is 254 gallons per day.449
Even critics of the Snake Valley Agreement acknowledged that "[w]e don't
do a very good job of conservation here in Utah."4 5 0 Indeed, Utah's "inflexible and
regressive water law contains several absurd provisions that work to promote the
waste of water, creating perverse incentives for water users."4 5' The primary water
use in Utah is irrigation,4 5 2 and the most common method is surface flooding,
followed by sprinklers.453 These inefficient irrigation processes should weigh
443 UTAH Div. OF WATER RES., THE COST OF WATER IN UTAH: WHY ARE OUR WATER
COSTS So Low 14 (2010) [hereinafter THE COST OF WATER], available at http://www.wat
er.utah.gov/Reports/The%20Cost%20of/2OWater%20in%2OUtah.pdf (stating that, from
1995 to 2005, Utahns reduced their overall per capita water use from 320 gpd to 260 gpd, a
19% decrease).
444 UTAH RIVERS COUNCIL, CROSSROADS UTAH: UTAH'S CLIMATE FUTURE 5 (2012)
[hereinafter UTAH'S CLIMATE FUTURE], http://www.utahrivers.org/wp-content/uploads/201
2/10/Crossroads.pdf; see also id. at 7 ("Utah has one of the worst records for river
protection in the West.").
THE COST OF WATER, supra note 443, at 4 tb.1 (citing 2006 American Water
Works Association database).
446id
447 Id. at 5-16 (listing several factors).
448 See, e.g., SARAH F. BATES ET AL., SEARCHING OUT THE HEADWATERS: CHANGE
AND REDISCOVERY IN WESTERN WATER POLICY 135 (1993) ("Artificially cheap water
helped to build a rural economy that has not proved to be sustainable in some areas. The
lure of cheap water caused many farmers to develop agriculturally marginal lands. Now
water is being transferred from farmlands to cities, leaving [rural] places . . . with few
economic options.").
4 9 Nevada Water Director Criticizes Utah, supra note 440.
450 Id. (quoting Steve Erickson, Utah Coordinator, Great Basin Water Network).
451 Edward A. Fornataro, Note, The Last Untapped River in Utah: An Argument
Against the Development of Bear River, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. 141, 142
(2008).
452 Utah Water Rights, supra note 406.
453 JAMES V. BARNHILL ET AL., SMALL ACREAGE IRRIGATION SYSTEM SELECTION
(2009), available at http://extension.usu.edu/files/publications/publication/AGSmallAcrea
ge 2009-Olpr.pdf.
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against Utah in the equitable-balancing test.454 Utah ranchers typically water
livestock (the second-largest use of Snake Valley groundwater) from a variety of
water sources, such as open air troughs, canals, ponds, and storage tanks. 45 5
Recent trends show no indication that this attitude is changing. A 2012 report
by the Utah Rivers Council found the state was "woefully unprepared" for the
impact of climate change on water and other natural resources and was engaged in
a "risky" failure to act.456
The Court should not limit its "reasonable conservation" analysis to water
policy, but also should consider states' broader efforts on energy issues (such as
policies on energy conservation and renewable energy production) because of the
deeply interdependent relationship between energy and water (the energy-water
nexus). Water is, of course, necessary for energy: thermoelectric power-plant
cooling, hydropower generation, and fossil-fuel extraction, refining, and
processing together account for an estimated 41 % of daily fresh water withdrawals
and 49% of total overall daily water withdrawals in the United States. But water
and energy are connected more broadly as well. Energy is necessary to supply,
transport, distribute, and use water in almost every conceivable way, and state
policies have an effect on how much energy is consumed and how energy is
produced.458 Moreover, the decision-making/policy-making processes for water
and energy policy have "intertwined features."459
454 See A. Dan Tarlock, Safeguarding International River Ecosystems in Times of
Scarcity, 3 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 231, 255-61 (2000) ("[U]nder some interpretations of
equitable apportionment, traditional practices such as the use of flood waters for irrigation
may be inefficient .... Waste counts against a state in the balancing test, and conservation
has traditionally meant that water should be efficiently consumed.").
455 Kevin Heaton, Save Time & Money: Using Remote Sensing Technology to Monitor
Stock Tanks,- UTAH STATE UNIV. COOPERATIVE EXTENSION, http://extension.usu.edu/
rangelands/htm/utah-projects/biwgk/water (last visited Jan. 14, 2014).
456 UTAH'S CLIMATE FUTURE, supra note 444, at 4; Judy Fahys, Climate Change
Report Calls Utah Policies 'Risky', SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 25, 2012, http://www.sltrib.com
/sltrib/news/55148513-78/utah-report-climate-state.html.csp (discussing UTAH'S CLIMATE
FUTURE).
457 Energy and Water in the Western and Texas Interconnects: Water Scarcity
Impacts Energy Production, SANDIA NAT'L LAB., http://energy.sandia.gov/?page_id=1741
(last visited Jan. 14, 2014).
4 58 See generally GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ENERGY-WATER NEXUS: AMOUNT
OF ENERGY NEEDED TO SUPPLY, USE, AND TREAT WATER Is LOCATION-SPECIFIC AND CAN
BE REDUCED BY CERTAIN TECHNOLOGIES AND APPROACHES (2011), available at http://ww
w.gao.gov/assets/320/316893.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY DEMANDS ON WATER
RESOURCES: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE INTERDEPENDENCY OF ENERGY AND WATER
(2006), available at http://www.sandia.gov/energy-water/docs/121-RptToCongress-EWwE
IAcomments-FINAL.pdf.
45 Steve A. Conrad, Decision-Support for the Water-Energy Nexus in the American
West, in THE WATER-ENERGY NEXUS IN THE AMERICAN WEST 197-99 (Douglas S. Kenney
& Robert Wilkinson eds., 2011).
1618 [No. 6
INTERSTATE GROUNDWATER LAW
On this score, Utah rates poorly. Governor Herbert has publicly questioned
the scientific basis for climate change, and under his administration the state has
withdrawn from the Western Climate Initiative. 4 6 0 The Utah House of
Representatives, for example, overwhelmingly passed a resolution in 2010
condemning "climate alarmists" and calling upon the EPA to "immediately halt its
carbon dioxide reduction policies." 4 61 The resolution's lead sponsor claimed that
the concept of global warming was "a conspiracy to control world population." 46 2
More recently, a state House committee killed a bill that would have allowed Utah
state land managers to consider climate change in land management decisions.4 63
These choices do not inspire much confidence in Utah's commitment to reasonable
conservation.
Nevada has a mandatory renewable energy portfolio standard464 that is
"among the most aggressive in the nation." 46 5 Nevada's policies are "in the
forefront of the renewable energy industry," featuring an ambitious 25% renewable
energy target by 2025 and "strong net metering and interconnection policies."4 66
By contrast, and "unlike many other states in the region, Utah does not have a
mandatory renewable portfolio standard," despite the fact that the state has vast
renewable-energy potential.467
Because Nevada's commitment to reasonable conservation is demonstrably
greater than Utah's, this factor will weigh in Nevada's favor.
460 Fahys, supra note 456; see also Josh Smith, Utah Legislature: Senate Committee
Wants Utah Out of Climate Initiative, DESERET NEWS, Mar. 3, 2010, http://www.deseret
news.com/article/700013360/Utah-Legislature-Senate-committee-wants-Utah-out-of-clima
te-initiative.html. Utah appears to be backsliding; Utah joined the Western Climate
Initiative under Governor Huntsman, who preceded Governor Herbert in office.
461 Suzanne Goldenberg, Utah Delivers Vote of No Confidence for "Climate
Alarmists", GUARDIAN, Feb. 12, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/feb/1
2/utah-climate-alarmists.
462 Judy Fahys, Lawmaker: Climate Change Just Ruse to Control Population, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Feb. 5, 2010, http://www.sltrib.com/News/ci 14337716.
463 Judy Fahys, Utah Lawmakers Kill Climate Change Bill, But Not Discussion, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Feb. 4, 2013, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/55764715-90/agenda-bill-
climate-committee.html.csp (last updated May 21, 2013, 11:31 PM).
464 S.B. 395, 75th Sess. (Nev. 2009), enacted June 8, 2009, codified at NEV. REV.
STAT. § 704.7821 (2009).
465 Michael Saunders, An Overview of Nevada's Renewable Energy Portfolio
Standard, NEV. LAw., July 2009, at 6, 7.
466 LESLEY HUNTER, AM. COUNCIL ON RENEWABLE ENERGY, RENEWABLE ENERGY IN
THE 50 STATES 69 (2012), available at http://www.acore.org/files/pdfs/states/2012-50state
report-lowres.pdf.
4671 d. at 101.
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4. Precise Nature ofProposed Interim and Ultimate Use in Nevada of Water from
Snake Valley and the Benefits that Would Result ifNevada Started Pumping
Nevada would use the water pumped from the Snake Valley primarily to
supply water to the Las Vegas metropolitan area, which has a population of over
two million people. Snake Valley, in contrast, has about one thousand people.468
Las Vegas received over 39.7 million visitors in 2012, a record number. 46 9 The
Snake Valley area of Utah receives some 3,000 tourists annually. 470 The Las Vegas
metropolitan area had a GDP of $92.76 million in 201 1.4 7 1 Snake Valley's
economic output is likely thousands of times smaller.
Water uses in the Snake Valley continue to be irrigation, stock watering, and
domestic uses, but there is a potential for alternative-energy development and
472expanded recreational and tourism uses, both of which require water.
5. Injury, ifAny, Utah Would Suffer as a Result of Nevada Pumping, Considering
Reasonable Conservation Measures that Could Offset Pumping by Nevada
Drip irrigation can use up to one-third less water than surface (flood)
irrigation and does well with alfalfa, 473 the main crop in the Snake Valley. 47 4
Currently, about 25,000 acre-feet of ground water are used for irrigation each year
in the Snake Valley area of Utah. If, at best, one-third less of that was used, about
8,300 fewer acre-feet of water would be used each year. This minimally offsets the
51,000 acre-feet of water to be piped to Las Vegas. There are other factors which
conservation could not offset, such as less available grazing land due to a dropped
water table.475 Typically, when grazing is not possible, Snake Valley farmers feed
their cattle alfalfa grown locally; this could lead to an increased demand for alfalfa
and a decreased ability to produce it given a lowered water table.476 Lastly, the cost
468 See supra text accompanying note 31.
469 2012 Las Vegas Year-To-Date Executive Summary, LAS VEGAS CONVENTION &
VISITORS AUTH., http://www.lvcva.com/includes/content/images/media/docs/ES-YTD2012
8.pdf; Joe Myxter, Jackpot! Las Vegas Attracted Record Number of Visitors in 2012, NBC
NEWS, Feb. 8, 2013, http://www.today.com/travel/jackpot-las-vegas-attracted-record-numb
er-visitors-2012-1B8310114.
470 See Socio-EcONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 23 (noting the number of
annual visitors to Fish Springs National Wildlife Refuge).
471 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Economic
Growth Continues Across Metropolitan Areas in 2011 (Feb. 22, 2013), available at http://
www.bea. gov/newsreleases/regional/gdpmetro/2013/pdf/gdp metro0213.pdf.
472 Socio-EcoNOMIc ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 24-25.
473 Cary Blake, Drip Irrigation Increasing Alfalfa Yields, W. FARM PRESS (May 18,
2009), http://westemfarmpress.com/alfalfaldrip-irrigation-increasing-alfalfa-yields.
474 Socio-EcONOMIc ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 19.
475 Id. at 20.
476 id
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to feed one head of cattle is around twenty-five times more expensive when using
alfalfa than grazing.477
As discussed infra, the groundwater law of both states allows for reasonable
drawdown in the water table, which may affect phreatophytes. 4 7 8 A model
developed by the SNWA's expert witness predicts the water table in the Spring
Valley, which neighbors the Snake Valley, will drop two hundred feet (sixty-one
meters) in seventy-five years.4 7 9 A USGS study using groundwater-flow models to
estimate the effects of groundwater pumping in the Snake Valley also found that
the water level was likely to drop, albeit by a more modest amount. 4 80 Greasewood
is the most common phreatophyte in the Great Basin, and its roots can reach up to
fifty-nine feet (eighteen meters) below ground.48 1 If the table is drawn down far
enough to kill grazing grasses (and note that cattle ranching is big business in
Utah's Snake Valley), greasewood will occupy that space. 4 8 2 If the table is drawn
down far enough to kill greasewood, significant topical erosion is possible.483
Lastly, there is some concern that by pumping a large amount of water from
the aquifer, the flow of water within the aquifer may reverse; it currently travels
from south to north, preventing saline water from the Great Salt Lake area from
infiltrating Snake Valley water supplies.4 84
4 77 Id.
478 See William D. Nichols, Groundwater Discharge by Phreatophyte Shrubs in The
Great Basin as Related to Depth to Groundwater, 30 WATER RESOURCES 3265 (1994),
available at http://water.nv.gov/hearings/past/spring/browseable/exhibits%5CUSBLM/BL
M-1523.PDF.
479 PAUL CUTILLO, EXPERT WITNESS STATEMENT FOR THE U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR 2 (2006), available at http://images.water.nv.gov/images/hearings%20exhibits/sp
ring%20valley/August%204th/USDI/Exhibits/Exhibit%232504/Report/Cutillo-Witness-Sta
tement.pdf (discussing results of hydrogeologist Timothy J. Durbin's model developed for
the Southern Nevada Water Authority).
480 KEITH J. HALFORD & RUSSELL W. PLUME, U.S. GEOL. SURVEY, SCL INV. 2011-
5032, POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF GROUNDWATER PUMPING ON WATER LEVELS,
PHREATOPHYTES, AND SPRING DISCHARGES IN SPRING AND SNAKE VALLEYS, WHITE PINE
COUNTY, NEVADA, AND ADJACENT AREAS IN NEVADA AND UTAH 37-38 (2011), available
at http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2011/5032/.
481 AMY M. MATHIE ET AL., U.S. GEOL. SURVEY, SC. INV. 3169, PHREATOPHYTIC
LAND-COVER MAP OF THE NORTHERN AND CENTRAL GREAT BASIN ECOREGION:
CALIFORNIA, IDAHO, NEVADA, UTAH, OREGON, AND WYOMING 5 (2011), available at http:
//pubs.usgs.gov/sim/3 169/sim3169pamphlet.pdf.
482 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., NEV. STATE OFFICE, CLARK, LINCOLN, AND WHITE
PINE COUNTIES GROUNDWATER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, ch.3.5, at 47 (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.blm.gov/nv/st/en/prog/
planing/groundwaterprojects/snwa groundwaterproject/finaleis.html (follow "Chapter
3.5" hyperlink).
483 See id. at ch. 3.5, at 47; id. at ch. 3.1, at 83 (follow "Chapter 3.1" hyperlink).
484 STEFAN KIRBY & HUGH HURLOW, UTAH GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, HYDROGEOLOGIC
SETTING OF THE SNAKE VALLEY HYDROGEOLOGIC BASIN, MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH, AND
WHITE PINE AND LINCOLN COUNTIES, NEVADA: IMPLICATIONS FOR POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF
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6. Additional Consideration-State Water Law Doctrines
Pure prior appropriation is the governing doctrine in both states for the use of
485groundwater, as well as surface water. Because Utah and Nevada both use the
same basic prior-appropriation legal doctrine for groundwater, the Supreme Court
would not be faced with the complicating issues that would arise if the two states
had very different groundwater law doctrines, such as the rule of capture and
correlative rights. Surface and groundwater sources are inextricably intertwined, as
surface water can be both a source of and result of groundwater supplies. 4 86 Both
states have developed reasonable limitations on groundwater use and agreed it was
applicable in the final Utah-Nevada Agreement.48 7 Neither state limits the use of
groundwater to overlying lands or otherwise restricts use of groundwater to a local
area.
Utah follows the safe-yield doctrine. The safe yield of an aquifer is "the
amount of groundwater that can be withdrawn from a groundwater basin over a
period of time without exceeding the long term recharge of the basin or
unreasonably affecting the basin's physical and chemical integrity." 4 88 Nevada
employs (but has not codified) the similar perennial-yield doctrine. 48 9 The
perennial yield is "the maximum amount of groundwater that can be salvaged each
PROPOSED WATER WELLS 33-34 (2005), available at http://geology.utah.gov/online/ri/ri-2
54.pdf; Ted McDonough, Reservoir Hogs, SALT LAKE CITY WKLY., Oct. 26, 2006, at 22-
24, 26.
485 GARY BRYNER & ELIZABETH PURCELL, GROUNDWATER LAW SOURCEBOOK OF THE
WESTERN UNITED STATES 21, 52 (2003).
486 BARCASS, supra note 23, at 45, 50 (noting that recharge occurs via runoff in
streambeds, and discharge can occur via spring and seep flow).
487 See Final Proposed Agreement, supra note 10, at §§ 2.8, 2.9.
488 UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-5-15(b) (West 2004). See also UTAH Div. OF WATER RES.,
UTAH'S WATER RESOURCES: PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE 67 (2001), available at http://ww
w.water.utah.gov/planning/SWP/SWP2001/SWPpff.pdf (defining "safe yield").
489 Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Ricci, 245 P.3d 1145, 1149 (Nev. 2010)
(upholding state engineer's authority to limit amount of water permitted to pump to
unappropriated perennial yield); Bacher v. Office of the State Eng'r, 146 P.3d 793, 800
n.34 (Nev. 2006) (referencing two decisions of the state engineer relying on perennial-yield
doctrine in denying permit); see also Amber L. Weeks, Defining the Public Interest:
Administrative Narrowing and Broadening of the Public Interest in Response to the
Statutory Silence of Water Codes, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 255, 268 n.57 (2010) (citing
Applications 49038 et al. to Appropriate the Public Waters within the Lower Reese River
Valley Hydrographic Basin, Ruling No. 5288, at 7 (Nev. State Eng'r Oct. 6, 2003)) ("The
State Engineer reasoned that since approval of the applications would result in groundwater
withdrawal exceeding the basin's perennial yield, approval of the applications would both
conflict with existing rights and be contrary to the public interest.").
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year over the long-term without depleting the groundwater reservoir." 4 9 0 The
perennial yield cannot be more than "the natural recharge" of the groundwater
reservoir and is usually "limited to-the maximum amount of natural discharge."4 9'
Since Las Vegas needs its water for domestic purposes-its growing
population-and since the Snake Valley predominantly uses water for irrigation
and stock watering, the Court also should consider the special importance of
municipal (sanitation and city supply) and domestic (drinking, cooking, and
washing) uses of water, which have historically been accorded special solicitude in
water law and have been given preference over use for irrigation and
manufacturing.
Although the domestic-use preference is sometimes more associated with
riparian states than prior-appropriation states,492 it is by no means alien to the
491 494West.49 3 While one state, Montana, eschews any use of preference, many more
prior-appropriation states provide that when not enough water is available for all
uses, preference is given to domestic uses. Colorado 495 and Idaho 4 96 provide for a
domestic-use preference in their state constitutions, while Arizona,4 97 California,498
Kansas, 499 and Wyoming500 have statutes to the same effect.
490 FRED W. WELDEN, LEGIS. COUNSEL BUREAU, HISTORY OF WATER LAW IN
NEVADA AND THE WESTERN STATES 8 (2003), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/
Division/Research/Publications/Bkground/BPO3-02.pdf/.
491 Id.
492 See, e.g., Mettler v. Ames Realty Co., 201 P. 702, 705 (Mont. 1921) ("The
common-law doctrine [of riparianism] . . . classifies the uses to which water may be
applied and gives preference to the so-called natural uses.").
493 See TARLOCK, supra note 7 at § 5:36; Robert E. Beck, Use Preferences for Water,
76 N.D. L. REv. 753, 765 (2000) (specifying that constitutions and statutes of "both
riparian and prior appropriation states contain preferred uses for water").
494 Mettler, 201 P. at 707 ("[S]everal provisions must be accepted as indicating the
public policy of Montana respecting the subject now under review. They recognize . . . that
the one first in time is first in right without reference to the so-called natural and artificial
uses.").
495 COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6 ("Priority of appropriation shall give the better right as
between those using the water for the same purpose; but when the waters of any natural
stream are not sufficient for the service of all those desiring the use of the same, those
using the water for domestic purposes shall have the preference over those claiming for any
other purpose . . . .").
, IDAHO CONST. art. XV, § 3 ("[W]hen the waters of any natural stream. are not
sufficient for the service of all those desiring the use of the same, those using the water for
domestic purposes shall . . . have the preference over those claiming for any other
purpose . . .").
497 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-157 (2012) (providing for preference for "domestic and
municipal uses," although limiting preference to pending applications).
498 CAL. WATER CODE § 106 (West 2010) ("It is hereby declared to be the established
policy of this State that the use of water for domestic purposes is the highest use of water
and that the next highest use is for irrigation."); id. § 1460 ("The application for a permit by
a municipality for the use of water for the municipality or the inhabitants thereof for
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Most importantly, both Utah and Nevada have historically recognized the
special status of domestic uses in some form. Utah enacted a statute in 1917
granting preference to domestic uses of water, but this provision was repealed in
2009501 at the instigation of the Utah farm lobby. 5 02 Still, the Utah Supreme Court
has recognized "[t]hat domestic use is the most beneficial use for water and that
irrigation is the next most beneficial use in the arid western states is a self-evident
and well recognized fact regardless of any statute" and has not receded from that
proposition. 50 3 Nevada has a domestic use exception for groundwater used by
single-family households, exempting such uses from permitting requirements.
The widespread application of domestic use preferences, and recognition (at least
implicitly) by both Utah and Nevada, underscores that providing water for its most
basic purpose, sustaining human life, is a paramount interest.0o
While predicting outcomes of fact-specific litigation can be challenging, it
seems highly likely that an equitable apportionment action of the Snake Valley
Aquifer will result in a roughly equal allocation of the annual safe yield between
Nevada and Utah. Using a conservative estimate of the annual safe yield at
100,000 acre-feet, Nevada could reasonably expect an allocation that is at least in
the ballpark of its desired diversion to Las Vegas. While the details are
exceptionally hard to predict, the essence of an expected adjudication would be
that Nevada gets the quantity of water that it would have gotten under the proposed
Snake Valley Agreement.
An additional consideration is that equitable-apportionment litigation is
phenomenally expensive. While any approach to managing water will involve
large-scale costs, most would agree that expenditures on studies, infrastructure,
domestic purposes shall be considered first in right, irrespective of whether it is first in
time.").
499 KAN. STAT. § 82a-707(b) (2012) ("Where lawful uses of water have the same date
of priority, such uses shall conform to the following order of preference: [a] Domestic, [b]
municipal, [c] irrigation, [d] industrial, [e] recreational and water power uses.").
50 WYO. STAT. § 41-3-102 (2009) ("preferred uses shall include rights for domestic
and transportation purposes," with "water for drinking purposes" and "for municipal
purposes" first in order of preference).
so' UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-21 (West 2008), repealed by 2009 Laws of Utah chap.
283 § 1, effective May 11, 2010.
502 John C. Ruple & Robert B. Keiter, Water for Commercial Oil Shale Development
in Utah: Allocating Scarce Resources and the Search for New Sources of Supply, 30 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 95, 97 n.18 (2010); J. Craig Smith & Scott M. Ellsworth, A
Preference for Domestic Water Use in Utah: A Relic of the Past?, WATER RESOURCES
COMMITTEE NEWSLETTER (A.B.A. Sec. of Env't, Energy & Resources, Water Resources
Comm.), Nov. 2009 at 9.
503 Tanner v. Bacon, 136 P.2d 957, 963 (Utah 1943).
5 NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 534.013, 534.180 (LexisNexis 2012).
5o5 See Laura A. Schroeder et al., Domestic Groundwater Exemptions: Competing
Uses Put Pressure on Western Water Right Requirements, But Constitutional Right to Life
May Trump the Prior Appropriation Doctrine, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 405, 424 (2011).
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conservation, and cooperative water management are more beneficial than the
transaction costs of litigation, including attorneys' fees, the costs of studies and
experts' fees, and opportunity costs. Experience says that these costs will be
massive; for example, equitable-apportionment litigation between Kansas and
Colorado over the Arkansas Rivet Basin,506 between New Mexico and Texas over
Elephant Butte,507 and between North and South Carolina over the Catawba River
each cost millions .50 8 The costs of original jurisdiction equitable apportionment
actions are especially troubling at a time when states, and their offices of attorneys
general, have experienced budget strains.o 9
The uncertainties and costs of litigation reinforce the need for a better solution
to managing interstate groundwater disputes. As with surface water disputes,
cooperation can produce a better outcome than litigation. The Supreme Court, like
many commentators, has repeatedly stated that interstate agreements are the
optimal way to resolve interstate water disputes. As just one example, in Colorado
v. Kansas510 the Court offered the following advice to the party states:
Such controversies may appropriately be composed by negotiation and
agreement, pursuant to the compact clause of the Federal constitution.
We say of this case, as the court has said of interstate differences of like
nature, that such mutual accommodation and agreement should, if
possible, be the medium of settlement, instead of invocation of our
adjudicatory power. 5
506 Tim Carpenter, A.G. Six to Argue Before Justices, TOPEKA CAPITAL-J., Nov. 27,
2008, http://cjonline.com/stories/112708/kan_360470374.shtml (stating that Kansas "spent
millions" in its suit against Colorado).
507 Staci Matlock, State Locked the Costly Legal Battle: AG Says Agreement on
Elephant Butte Releases Favors Texas, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Aug. 15, 2011, at Al.
508 CHRIS MAYDA, A REGIONAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA:
TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 211 (2013) (pointing out that the Carolinas spent
millions battling each other); Associated Press, SC Attorney General Seeks Millions to
Fight NC in Water Dispute, Feb. 27, 2008, http://www.witn.com/home/headlines/16019747
.html (reporting that by early 2008 the South Carolina attorney general's office had already
been allocated $1.4 million to fund Catawba River litigation, and that the attorney general
estimated that South Carolina could spend in excess of $3 million on the case).
509 See, e.g., 2011 APPROPRIATIONS REPORT, NEVADA LEGISLATURE, NEVADA
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, FISCAL ANALYSIS DIVISION 74, available at http://www.le
g.state.nv.us/Division/fiscal/Appropriation%20Reports/2011 AppropriationsReport/4Electe
d%200fficials.pdf ("For the 2011-13 biennium, the Legislature approved $104.2 million in
total funding for the [Office of the Attorney General], a 7.5 percent decrease from the
amount approved for the 2009-11 biennium of $112.6 million.").
510 320 U.S. 383 (1943).
" Id. at 392.
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The proposed Snake Valley Aquifer Agreement provides a model solution for
states to use in taking the Supreme Court's repeated advice to avoid litigation with
cooperation and interstate compacts.
CONCLUSION
As states increasingly utilize groundwater to meet their growing demands for
freshwater resources, disputes over interstate aquifers will become more common
and pervasive. The Supreme Court's equitable apportionment doctrine can be
applied to these disputes with the same limited success as with surface water
systems. The Snake Valley Aquifer dispute shows that litigation is a possible
solution, but not an ideal one. Instead, states should use the compact mechanism
that has been applied to surface water systems, tailored with specific provisions for
the complexities of groundwater management. The Snake Valley Aquifer
Agreement, rejected for political reasons, offers a model for sustainable interstate
groundwater management. Given the cost and expected outcomes of equitable-
apportionment litigation, Utah should reconsider an agreement with Nevada to
cooperatively use and manage the Snake Valley Aquifer.
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